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It has been sixty years since the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of 
Education,
1
 yet schools in some states remain racially divided, and the debate 
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 1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  Brown held that the segregation of children in public schools 
solely on the basis of race deprives them of equal educational opportunities and violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. at 494–95. 
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over affirmative action continues.  Previously, the contest over affirmative 
action centered on whether remedying past discrimination
2
 and diversifying 
student populations in schools were compelling justifications for using racial 
classifications.
3
  The Court has found both purposes compelling.
4
 
After Grutter v. Bollinger,
5
 in which the Court held that race may be 
implemented as a “plus factor” in higher education admissions practices in 
order to attain the educational benefits that flow from a diverse study body,
6
 
schools began implementing complex admissions criteria that take an 
applicant’s race into consideration.  Colleges and universities in Texas 
responded to Grutter by resuming the use of race in their admissions 
procedures, a practice the schools previously eliminated.
7
  The University of 
Texas at Austin (UT Austin) maintained dual admissions policies: the race-
neutral “Texas Top Ten Percent Plan,” and a different race-based policy that 
considered race as one of many factors.
8
 
In Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin,
9
 Abigail Fisher, a white applicant 
denied admission under the race-based policy, challenged the University’s 
continued use of race in making admissions decisions when a race-neutral 
alternative, the Texas Top Ten Percent Plan, already produced a diverse 
student body.
10
  Fisher argued that the University’s race-based admissions 
policy was no longer necessary to achieve diversity and, thus, the University 
no longer had a compelling interest to justify using race as a consideration for 
admission.
11
  In a show of deference to the University, the Fifth Circuit upheld 
the program.
12
  The Supreme Court, however, held that the Fifth Circuit 
                                                 
 2. See, e.g., Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 468, 496–97 (1989) (distinguishing 
the goal of remedying a government actor’s past discrimination from the impermissible goal of 
remedying general societal discrimination); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276, 
280 (1986) (differentiating between societal discrimination, which is impermissibly vague, and a 
narrowly tailored program that remedies the effects of prior discrimination); Regents of Univ. of 
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1977) (finding that a state has a legitimate interest in 
remedying identified discrimination, but not “societal discrimination”). 
 3. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (holding that attaining the 
educational benefits of diversity is a compelling government interest). 
 4. See, e.g., id. at 329 (finding that a diverse student body is a compelling reason to 
consider race in state university admissions decisions); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 (holding that 
diversity is a compelling reason for considering race in college admissions decisions). 
 5. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 6. Id. at 334. 
 7. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415–16 (2013). 
 8. Id. at 2416. 
 9. 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
 10. Id. at 2433 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 11. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 645 F. Supp. 2d 587, 603 (W.D. Tex. 2009), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 
2411 (2013). 
 12. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2417. 
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incorrectly applied strict scrutiny when it deferred to the University.
13
  The 
Court insisted that the lower court must rigorously scrutinize whether a school 
has proven that no workable race-neutral alternatives exist in order to show 
that its race-based program is necessary, and therefore, narrowly tailored.
14
 
The purpose of this Article is to explore the available race-neutral options 
that colleges and universities can use to achieve diversity and whether, 
following Fisher’s mandate, schools must consider those alternatives.  To that 
end, Part I of this Article notes that the emphasis of the Court’s affirmative 
action jurisprudence has changed, and that the pivotal issue is now whether an 
institution’s affirmative action program is narrowly tailored. 
The question of whether a program is narrowly tailored is now refined, after 
Fisher, to an inquiry of whether there are race-neutral alternatives that will 
work “about as well”
15
 as racial affirmative action.  Fisher shifts the 
affirmative action discussion from the normative issue of whether schools 
should consider race as a factor, to the doctrinal question of whether there are 
workable race-neutral alternatives.  Now, a school must prove there are no 
workable race-neutral alternatives in order to use race-based affirmative action.  
The next frontier in affirmative action litigation will focus on how much 
diversity is sufficient to conclude that a race-neutral alternative is workable 
and which race-neutral alternatives schools must consider.  Part I addresses 
those questions and argues that there are many race-neutral alternatives with 
demonstrated success that higher education institutions must consider before 
they can implement an admissions policy that uses race as a factor.
16
 
Part II discusses the race-neutral alternatives available to higher education 
institutions, including percentage plans; class-based affirmative action; the 
elimination of legacy and development admissions acceptances; university-
based recruitment, retention, and financial aid plans;
17
 and community 
                                                 
 13. Id. at 2421. 
 14. Id. at 2420–21.  Throughout this Article, the term “narrowly tailored” is intended to also 
encompass the requirement of showing necessity. 
 15. Id. at 2420 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 16. This Article does not focus on whether there is a greater imperative to achieve the 
objectives underlying a particular race-neutral alternative, such as socioeconomic diversity over 
racial diversity.  Rather, this Article explores the impact of Fisher on affirmative action programs 
in higher education and whether Fisher mandates race-neutral alternatives, such as 
socioeconomic affirmative action or percentage plans, and whether those alternatives work as 
well as race-based programs.  Thus, if any discussion about comparisons between race-neutral 
and race-based programs can be construed as favoring a race-neutral program, it should be 
understood as resulting from doctrinal analysis—not from a normative assessment. 
 17. Institutions should also consider implementating recruitment, retention, and financial aid 
programs that will increase diversity.  Constitutionally speaking, institutions may engage in race- 
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outreach.
18
  In fact, some universities have already explored the viability of 
race-neutral percentage plans and class-based admissions policies.
19
  A 
comparison of the levels of diversity in California, Texas, and Florida when 
race was a component of admissions policies to levels of diversity when racial 
admissions were eliminated shows that percentage plans are effective.
20
  Even 
at those states’ premier universities, underrepresented minority enrollment 
reached, or even exceeded, the levels from when racial bans were in effect.
21
 
Class-based plans focus on the socioeconomic status of applicants in 
recognition that a student’s socioeconomic status is highly correlated with 
                                                                                                                 
conscious policies that treat everyone fairly.  For example, Justice Kennedy previously opined 
that fair race-conscious procedures are permissible: 
If school authorities are concerned that the student-body compositions of certain 
schools interfere with the objective of offering an equal educational opportunity to all 
of their students, they are free to devise race-conscious measures to address the 
problem in a general way and without treating each student in different fashion solely 
on the basis of a systematic, individual typing by race. 
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788–89 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).  Therefore, in order to retain 
minority students, institutions may target low-income neighborhoods or high schools during 
recruiting, provide substantial financial aid to low-income students, and offer counseling and 
additional academic assistance to students from underperforming high schools. 
 18. Community outreach programs, such as partnering with K-12 schools, mentoring, 
providing summer programs and Boot Camps, enhancing teacher education, increasing Advance 
Placement courses, and initiating science-based reading practices help children from 
underrepresented communities and low-performing schools gain college admission.  U.S. DEP’T 
OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ACHIEVING DIVERSITY: RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES IN 
AMERICAN EDUCATION 5 (2004) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, 
ACHIEVING DIVERSITY], available at https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/edlite-
raceneutral 
report2.html. 
 19. See infra Part II.A–B. 
 20. See GARY M. LAVERGNE & BRUCE WALKER, IMPLEMENTATION AND RESULTS OF THE 
TEXAS AUTOMATIC ADMISSIONS LAW (HB 588) AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN: 
DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS FALL 2003, ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE OF TOP 10% AND NON-TOP 
10% STUDENTS ACADEMIC YEARS 1996-2002 3–4 (2003) [hereinafter LAVERGNE & WALKER, 
IMPLEMENTATION], available at http://www.utexas.edu/student/admissions/research/HB588-
Report6-part1.pdf (discussing diversity levels at Texas attributable to the Texas Top Ten Percent 
Plan); THE UNIV. OF CAL., OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF STUDENTS 
AND STAFF: FALL 2012 27 tbl.7k (2012) [hereinafter UNIV. OF CAL., STATISTICAL SUMMARY: 
FALL 2012], available at http://legacy-
its.ucop.edu/uwnews/stat/statsum/fall2012/statsumm2012.pdf (illustrating enrollment numbers by 
ethnicity, gender, and academic level); infra note 101 and accompanying text (demonstrating that 
Florida universities admitted more minority students when a percentage plan was in place). 
 21. See, e.g., Bruce Walker & Gary Lavergne, Affirmative Action and Percent Plans: What 
We Learned in Texas, COLL. BOARD REV., May 2001, at 18, 20 [hereinafter Walker & Lavergne, 
What We Learned in Texas] (noting that UT Austin regained pre-racial admissions ban diversity 
levels). 
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school and test performance.
22
    Schools that implement class-based 
affirmative action demonstrate that giving a boost to economically 
disadvantaged applicants increases the level of diversity compared to the 
diversity level race-based affirmative action creates.
23
  The benefits of class-
based admission programs are that they change our perspective on how to view 
deservedness and address the problem of structural mobility for the 
impoverished. 
Institutions need not implement these plans, but at a minimum, they should 
be required to articulate to a court why these plans would not work “about as 
well” as race-based admissions policies.  Schools subjected to the rigorous 
judicial scrutiny required by Fisher will have difficulty rejecting, for example, 
percentage plans and class-based affirmative action without identifying the 
school’s unique circumstances that would limit the feasibility of these 
alternatives. 
Relatedly, schools focused on attaining diversity must eliminate legacy and 
development admissions. Policies allowing preferences for legacy and 
development applicants are not per se unconstitutional.
24
  But when coupled 
with race-based affirmative action, these preferences cannot be justified.  
Studies reveal that legacy and development applicants are overwhelmingly 
white and come from privileged families.  Therefore, those preferences reduce 
a school’s level of diversity.
25
  Even if these privileged admissions represent a 
small percentage of all admissions, a school must prove to a court that it 
considered workable, race-neutral steps to increase diversity before it can 
justifiably rely on racial admissions.  This logically entails eliminating policies 
that work against diversity.
26
  Thus, colleges and universities must choose 
                                                 
 22. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Reflections on Richard Sander’s Class in American Legal 
Education, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 719, 724 (2011) [hereinafter Kahlenberg, Reflections] (citing 
Anthony P. Carnevale & Jeff Strohl, How Increasing College Access is Increasing Inequality, 
and What to Do About It, in REWARDING STRIVERS: HELPING LOW-INCOME STUDENTS SUCCEED 
IN COLLEGE 71, 173 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2010) [hereinafter Carnevale & Strohl, 
Increasing College Access]) (noting that researchers have found “most of the predictors of low 
SAT scores are socioeconomic in nature”). 
 23. Matthew N. Gaertner & Melissa Hart, Considering Class: College Access and Diversity, 
7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 367, 392 (2013). 
 24. Steve D. Shadowen, Sozi P. Tulante & Shara L. Alpern, No Distinctions Except Those 
Which Merit Originates: The Unlawfulness of Legacy Preferences in Public and Private 
Universities, 49 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 51, 52 & n.3 (2009). 
 25. Richard Kahlenberg, Online Fisher Symposium: Race-Neutral Alternatives Work, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 4, 2012, 4:36 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/online-fisher-
symposium-race-neutral-alternatives-work/ [hereinafter Kahlenberg, Race-Neutral Alternatives 
Work]. 
 26. Eliminating preferences for legacy applicants is feasible for universities because doing 
so does not financially cripple a school.  See Chad Coffman, Tara O’Neil, & Brian Starr, An 
Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Legacy Preferences on Alumni Giving at Top Universities, in 
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between implementing racial admissions policies and giving preferences to 
legacy and development applicants. 
Additionally, schools should implement university-based programs that 
recruit and retain minorities and make higher education a financial possibility.  
Further, colleges and universities should reach out beyond the school’s walls 
into the community to build a pool of applicants prepared for undergraduate 
and graduate education.  The Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence supports 
the expectation that before schools resort to racial affirmative action, they will 
take steps to reduce the financial barriers to higher education and to remedy the 
problems that underlie minority access.
27
 
Part III discusses that, in order for schools to follow Fisher’s instruction that 
they must prove there are no workable race-neutral alternatives to 
implementing a race-based admissions policy, schools must be transparent in 
their admissions policies.  Before a court is able to evaluate rigorously whether 
a school’s racial admissions policy is narrowly tailored, schools must publicly 
disclose the details of its policies, resources, and limitations. 
In this regard, as discussed in Part IV, Fisher changed and clarified the 
boundaries of academic freedom.  In fact, Fisher limits academic freedom to a 
school’s prerogative in choosing its educational mission.  Although schools 
may choose the methods by which to attain their missions, Fisher imposes 
restraint on the chosen methods.  Schools may no longer choose their manner 
of operation without regard to narrow tailoring. 
I.  THE JURISPRUDENCE OF “NARROW TAILORING” 
The debate over affirmative action no longer centers on the justification for 
race-based decision making.
28
  Rather, it focuses on whether racial actions are 
narrowly tailored.  Government actors using racial classifications must pass 
strict scrutiny by showing that the classifications are “‘necessary to further a 
compelling governmental interest’ and ‘narrowly tailored to that end.’”
29
  Most 
racial classifications with a compelling purpose are defeated by the 
                                                                                                                 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE RICH: LEGACY PREFERENCES IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 101, 101 
(Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2010) (studying the relationship between legacy admissions and 
donations at the top 100 universities from 1998 to 2008); Richard D. Kahlenberg, 10 Myths about 
Legacy Preferences in College Admissions, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Sept. 22, 2010, 
http://chronicle.com/article/10-Myths-About-Legacy/124561/ [hereinafter Kahlenberg, 10 Myths] 
(characterizing the idea that “[l]egacy preferences are a necessary evil” as a myth). 
 27. See infra Part II.D–E. 
 28. The Court has recognized two interests as compelling justifications for using racial 
classifications: the remedy of past discrimination caused by the actor and the attainment of a 
diverse student body in higher education. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. 
No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720–22 (2007). 
 29. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2422 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting 
Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 514 (2005)). 
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necessity/narrowly tailored requirement.
30
  Therefore, the meaning of narrowly 
tailored is the critical question. 
Before a court may deem a race-based concept narrowly tailored, the 
government must engage in “truly individualized consideration” in which race 
is used “in a flexible, non-mechanical way.”
31
  The mandate for individualized 
consideration necessarily prohibits putting racial groups on separate tracks and 
insulating them from competition.
32
  Thus, individualized consideration cannot 
be performed through the use of quotas.
33
  In Regents of University of 
California v. Bakke,
34
 the Court invalidated the University of California at 
Davis (UC Davis) Medical School’s admissions program that reserved 16 out 
of 100 seats for minorities in each entering class.
35
  The rigid quota did not 
afford each applicant individualized consideration whereby the school could 
assess how the applicant’s unique qualities and abilities would contribute to the 
student body and educational setting.
36
  Similarly, in Richmond v. J. A. Croson 
Co.,
37
 the Court held that Richmond’s practice of setting aside thirty percent of 
city construction contracts for minority business enterprises was not narrowly 
tailored.
38
  Quotas, such as those in Bakke and Croson, are inconsistent with 
the narrow tailoring requirement because they do not allow competition on 
equal footing.
39
 
Additionally, an automatic distribution of points to a candidate because the 
candidate is a minority does not meet the requirement of individualized 
decision making when those points are decisive.  In Gratz v. Bollinger,
40
 the 
Court invalidated the University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions 
policy because it awarded twenty points to every underrepresented minority 
applicant simply because of his or her race.
41
  Because the twenty points 
                                                 
 30. Eang L. Ngov, When “the Evil Day” Comes, Will Title VII’s Disparate Impact 
Provision Be Narrowly Tailored to Survive an Equal Protection Clause Challenge?, 60 AM. U. L. 
REV. 535, 539 (2011) (“It is said that strict scrutiny is ‘strict in theory and fatal in fact,’ but a 
review of the Supreme Court’s equal protection cases reveals that perhaps strict scrutiny is fatal 
because of narrow tailoring.”). 
 31. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 334 (2003). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
 35. Id. at 275. 
 36. See id. at 318 (suggesting that admissions programs that consider race as only one 
among many admissions factors are not facially infirm). 
 37. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
 38. Id. at 507–08. 
 39. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317 (noting that the quota insulated minority applicants from 
comparison with other applicants). 
 40. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 41. Id. at 270. 
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represented one-fifth of the points necessary for a guaranteed admission, race 
played a decisive role in an applicant’s consideration.
42
  Although the 
admissions office considered other “soft” variables, such as “leadership and 
service, personal achievement, and geographic diversity,” the points awarded 
for those variables were “capped” such that “[e]ven the most outstanding 
national high school leader could never receive more than five points . . . .”
43
 
In contrast to quotas and point allocations, narrow tailoring permits 
consideration of race as a “plus” factor.
44
  In Grutter v. Bollinger,
45
 the Court 
upheld the University of Michigan Law School’s admission procedures, which 
used race as a plus factor to enhance diversity, against an equal protection 
challenge.
46
  Recognizing diversity as a compelling purpose,
47
 the Court noted 
that the school’s policy neither defined diversity “solely in terms of racial or 
ethnic status” nor restricted the manner in which an applicant could contribute 
to the school’s diversity.
48
  The law school’s admission procedures were 
narrowly tailored because race was not a decisive factor.
49
  By using race as a 
plus factor, the policy was flexible, and each applicant received individualized 
consideration.
50
 
In addition to individualized consideration, narrow tailoring requires the 
government to show that its reliance on racial classification is necessary to 
achieve the government’s purported purpose.
51
  In order to prove necessity, the 
government must show “serious, good faith consideration of workable race-
neutral alternatives.”
52
  If a neutral approach can achieve the same objective 
“about as well and at tolerable administrative expense,” then a race-based 
approach is impermissible.
53
  In Croson, the Court criticized the city of 
Richmond for not availing itself of race-neutral options to increase access to 
the city’s contracting opportunities.
54
  Likewise, in Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District Number 1,
55
 the school districts 
                                                 
 42. See id. 
 43. Id. at 279. 
 44. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317. 
 45. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 46. Id. at 343. 
 47. Id. at 329. 
 48. Id. at 316. 
 49. Id. at 334. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013) 
 52. Id. (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339). 
 53. Id. (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276, 280 n.6 (1986)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 54. Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 468, 509–10 (1989). 
 55. 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
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failed to consider race-neutral alternatives before using racial classifications to 
assign students to schools.
56
 
Thus, the burden of proving an admissions procedure is narrowly tailored 
falls on the government.
57
  The Fisher Court made clear that although a court 
may consider a school’s “experience and expertise in adopting or rejecting 
certain admissions processes[,]” the school is not entitled to any deference on 
the issue of narrow tailoring.
58
  In Fisher, an applicant to UT Austin 
challenged the school’s use of race as one factor in determining admissions.
59
  
The University maintained that the racial admissions procedures were 
necessary because, although the student body as a whole was diverse, the 
University lacked diversity in small classes consisting of five to twenty-four 
students.
60
  The lower courts held that courts must provide substantial 
deference to a school’s educational interest in defining diversity and whether 
the school’s plan is narrowly tailored.
61
  The Supreme Court concluded that the 
lower courts failed to apply the correct standard of strict scrutiny
62
 because a 
University should not receive deference as to whether the means it chose were 
narrowly tailored to its diversity goals.
63
  Writing for the Court, Justice 
Kennedy emphasized that “[s]trict scrutiny does not permit a court to accept a 
school’s assertion that its admissions process uses race in a permissible way 
without a court giving close analysis to the evidence of how the process works 
in practice.”
64
  Thus, “strict scrutiny imposes on the university the ultimate 
burden of demonstrating, before turning to racial classifications, that available, 
workable race-neutral alternatives do not suffice.”
65
 
The effect of Fisher, for which Justice Kennedy urged in his earlier Grutter 
dissent, is to “force educational institutions to seriously explore race-neutral 
alternatives.”
66
  Although a school need not exhaust every possible 
alternative,
67
 Fisher makes clear that the Court intends race to be “a last 
resort.”
68
  The question that remains is what race-neutral alternatives are 
                                                 
 56. Id. at 735. 
 57. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419. 
 58. Id. at 2420. 
 59. Id. at 2415. 
 60. Id. at 2416. 
 61. Id. at 2417. 
 62. Id. at 2415. 
 63. Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2420. 
 64. Id. at 2421. 
 65. Id. at 2420. 
 66. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 394 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 67. Id. at 339. 
 68. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788–89 
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). 
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“workable” and can achieve the benefits of diversity “about as well” as racial 
affirmative action? 
II.  RACE-NEUTRAL ALTERNATIVES 
The requirement to consider race-neutral alternatives applies equally to 
public and private institutions of higher education because “[v]irtually every 
private college” receives federal funding, and thus, will be restrained by the 
Supreme Court’s limitations on race-based programs.
69
  Satisfactory 
alternatives are “polic[ies] that serve[] the same function as what [they] 
replace[].”
70
  Race-neutral alternatives can include approaches that target an 
admissions procedure itself; focus on other internal programs at an institution, 
beyond the admissions procedure, that provide support to enable students to 
succeed; or reach beyond the institution’s walls to broaden the pipeline of 
applicants who are prepared for higher education. 
A.  High School Rank: Percentage Plans 
1.  A Retrospective of Percentage Plans 
As discussed, one race-neutral option schools should explore before relying 
on race-based admissions programs is a percentage plan, which admits students 
solely on the basis of their class rank within their high school graduating class.  
To date, Texas, California, and Florida have implemented percentage plans.
71
 
Percentage plans have originated as a response to a court order, state 
referendum, or executive branch initiative to prohibit race-based affirmative 
action in higher education.
72
  Texas’s percentage plan was conceived in 
                                                 
 69. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Future of Diversity, 69 NAT’L LAW. GUILD REV. 193, 195 
(2012). 
 70. Richard Ford, Online Fisher Symposium: A Response to Richard Kahlenberg, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 17, 2012, 11:40 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/online-fisher-
symposium-a-response-to-richard-kahlenberg/.  Professor Ford suggests that 
socio-economic class is not “an alternative” to race-conscious affirmative action, but 
instead a distinct policy that must be evaluated on its own merits . . . . Race- and class-
based admissions policies are not “alternatives” in the sense of being mutually 
exclusive or hydraulically related—the level of one rising as the other falls. 
Id. 
 71. See Douglas Laycock, The Broader Case for Affirmative Action: Desegregation, 
Academic Excellence, and Future Leadership, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1767, 1818 (2004). 
 72. See CATHERINE L. HORN & STELLA M. FLORES, THE CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, 
HARVARD UNIV., PERCENT PLANS IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
THREE STATES’ EXPERIENCES 16–23 (2003), available at 
http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/college-access/admissions/percent-plans-in-college-
admissions-a-comparative-analysis-of-three-states2019-experiences/horn-percent-plans-2003.pdf 
 
2014] Narrowly Tailoring Affirmative Action 11 
response to a court order.  In Hopwood v. Texas,
73
 after four white students 
challenged the admissions procedure of the University of Texas as violating 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth Circuit banned race-based admissions 
programs.
74
  Consequently, a task force comprised of faculty from the Center 
for Mexican-American Studies at the University of Texas and the University of 
Houston, and the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Education Fund 
answered State Senator Gonzolo Barrientos’s call to address the ramifications 
of Hopwood.
75
  The task force’s work resulted in the Texas Top Ten Percent 
Plan, which became effective in the fall of 1997.
76
  Texas’s percentage plan 
guarantees admission into the student’s choice of public universities if a 
student ranks within the top ten percent of her high school graduating class.
77
 
In California, voters approved Proposition 209 (Prop. 209), also known as 
the California Civil Rights Initiative, which amended California’s Constitution 
to prohibit racial preferences in public employment, education, and 
contracting.
78
  After the Supreme Court denied further appeal in 1997,
79
 Prop. 
209 became effective for the fall 1998 entering class.
80
  In 1999, Governor 
Gray Davis proposed a four percent plan similar to Texas’s percentage plan, 
which became effective in fall 2001.
81
  California’s percentage plan, known as 
the “Eligibility in Local Context,” guarantees admission to one of California’s 
public universities to students ranking in the top four percent of their high 
school graduating class.
82
 
In Florida, the ban on racial preferences was a preemptive step that former 
Governor Jeb Bush took in response to Ward Connerly’s efforts to initiate a 
voter referendum in Florida.
83
  In 1999, by executive order, Governor Bush 
implemented “One Florida,” which prohibited racial preferences in 
                                                                                                                 
(providing a history and detailing the mechanics of percentage plans in Texas, California, and 
Florida). 
 73. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 74. See id. at 934 (holding that there was no justification for the school to “elevate some 
races over others”). 
 75. HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 16. 
 76. Id. at 16–17. 
 77. Id. at 17. 
 78. Id.; Office of Equal Opportunity and Diversity, A Brief History of Affirmative Action, 
OEOD, http://www.oeod.uci.edu/aa.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2014) [hereinafter A Brief History 
of Affirmative Action]. 
 79. A Brief History of Affirmative Action, supra note 78. 
 80. HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 17. 
 81. Id. at 18. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Peter T. Kilborn, Jeb Bush Roils Florida on Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 
2000, at A1.  See also HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 19 (noting that the Florida program 
resembled California’s). 
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employment, contracting, and education, but allowed race-conscious 
scholarships, outreach, and summer programs.
84
  Governor Bush also 
implemented the “Talented 20 Plan,” which guaranteed students ranking in the 
top twenty percent of their graduating class admission into one of Florida’s 
public colleges and universities, but not necessarily admission to the 
applicant’s first choice.
85
  The Talented 20 program became effective for the 
entering fall 2000 class.
86
 
2.  Percentage Plan Advantages and Disadvantages 
Percentage plans succeed in creating a diverse student population.  By 
allowing each high school in the state to send its top ranked students to the 
state’s public universities and colleges, percentage plans have greatly increased 
geographic diversity.
87
  At UT Austin, for example, before Hopwood, the 
entering class was comprised of graduates from 622 high schools, but half of 
those students represented only sixty-four high schools.
88
  In 2013, the number 
of high schools feeding into UT Austin increased to 1,102.
89
 
Statistical evidence also shows that percentage plans have achieved 
comparable levels of racial diversity as when race-based programs were in 
place.  When UT Austin revised its admissions program to exclude race and 
include the Top Ten Percent Plan, the result was the most diverse entering 
class in the school’s history.
90
  In 2003, the University of Texas’s incoming 
class was comprised of sixteen percent Hispanics, compared with fourteen 
percent pre-Hopwood.
91
  The percentage of African Americans enrolled 
                                                 
 84. HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 19. 
 85. See id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Marta Tienda & Sunny Xinchun Niu, Flagships, Feeders, and the Texas Top 10% Law: 
A Test of the “Brain Drain” Hypothesis, J. HIGHER EDUC. 712, 713 (2006) (noting that “benefits 
include greater geographic diversity of incoming students”). 
 88. DAVID MONTEJANO, ACCESS TO THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN AND THE TEN 
PERCENT PLAN: A THREE-YEAR ASSESSMENT 1 (2006), available at http://www.utexas.edu/ 
student/admissions/research/montejanopaper.html. 
 89. WILLIAM POWERS JR., THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN: REPORT TO THE 
GOVERNOR, THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR, AND THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SB 175, 81ST LEGISLATURE, FOR THE PERIOD 
ENDING FALL 2013 6, available at  http://www.utexas.edu/student/admissions/research/SB_175_ 
Report_for_2013.pdf.  This number is based on the admitted students, as opposed to the enrolled 
students.  See id. at 7. 
 90. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2416 (2013); LAVERGNE & WALKER, 
IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 20, at 3. 
 91. See LAVERGNE & WALKER, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 20, at 4.  However, 
increasing diversity in Texas’s statewide population may have contributed to the success of 
Texas’s percentage plan.  Kahlenberg, Race-Neutral Alternatives Work, supra note 25. 
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through the percentage plan in 2003 was equal to pre-Hopwood levels.
92
  Even 
Texas’s flagship, UT Austin, regained its pre-Hopwood diversity levels by 
1999.
93
  The University admits its percentage plan has been successful.  The 
University of Texas at Austin concedes that that the percentage plan produced 
more students who were “the first in their families to attend college” than 
holistic reviews that consider race.
94
  In 2008, eighty-one percent of students in 
the University’s entering class were admitted through the percentage plan,
95
 
which, as a testament to the percentage plan’s success, led the Texas 
legislature to cap the number of Top Ten Percent students admitted to UT 
Austin at seventy-five percent.
96
 
Such evidence of the University of Texas’s success, achieved without 
relying on race as a factor, makes it difficult for the University to argue that it 
is necessary to implement raced-based programs because there are no workable 
race-neutral alternatives.  It also places the burden on other institutions to show 
why a similar program would not work at their school. 
In California, there were substantial increases in underrepresented minority 
enrollment after Prop. 209 compared to prior enrollment numbers.
97
  The 
following table aggregates data from the University of California’s admissions 
reports and provides a side-by-side comparison of admission rates by ethnicity 
in 1997
98
 (before Prop. 209) and in 2012.
99
 
                                                 
 92. LAVERGNE & WALKER, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 20, at 3. 
 93. Walker & Lavergne, What We Learned in Texas, supra note 21. 
 94. In its brief, UT Austin stated, 
And, in fact, admissions data show that African-American and Hispanic students 
admitted through holistic review are, on average, more likely than their top 10% 
counterparts to have attended an integrated high school; are less likely to be the first in 
their families to attend college; tend to have more varied socioeconomic backgrounds; 
and, on average, have higher SAT scores than their top-10% counterparts. 
Brief for Respondents at 33–34 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) 
(emphasis added). 
 95. 11 OFFICE OF ADMISSIONS, THE UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN, IMPLEMENTATION AND 
RESULTS OF THE TEXAS AUTOMATIC ADMISSIONS LAW (HB 588) AT THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 
AT AUSTIN: DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF ENTERING FRESHMEN FALL 2008, ACADEMIC 
PERFORMANCE OF TOP 10% AND NON-TOP 10% STUDENTS ACADEMIC YEARS 2003-2007 9 
tb1.2b (2008), available at https://www.utexas.edu/student/admissions/research/HB588-
Report11.pdf. 
 96. Gaertner & Hart, supra note 23, at 375; Intercultural Dev. Research Ass’n, Update on 
Texas Top 10% Plan for Your Students, IDRA, http://www.idra.org/Education_Policy.htm/ 
Access_to_Higher_Education/Update_on_Texas_Top_10%_Plan_for_Your_Students_/ (last 
visited Sept. 25, 2014). 
 97. See UNIV. OF CAL., STATISTICAL SUMMARY: FALL 2012, supra note 20, at 27 tbl.7k. 
 98. Univ. of Cal., Statistical Summary of Students and Staff, U. CAL. OFFICE PRESIDENT, 
http://legacy-its.ucop.edu/uwnews/stat/enrollment/enr1997/97sst7j.html (last updated Jan. 16, 
1998). 
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Table 1 
  Enrollment 
for 1997 
Enrollment 
for 2012 
Percentage 
change in 
enrollment (before Prop. 
209) 
American Indian 1,201 1,290 7.41% 
African American 5,003 6,817 36.26% 
Chicano/Chicana 12,354 28,898 133.92% 
Latino/Latina 4,841 8,503 75.65% 
Filipino/Pilipino 5,659 8,016 41.65% 
Chinese 16,705 27,604 65.24% 
Japanese 2,658 3,355 26.22% 
Korean 6,674 8,046 20.56% 
Other Asian 10,202 14,672 43.81% 
Pakistani/East 
Indian/Other 
5,621 7,444 32.43% 
White 50,552 51,098 1.08% 
 
Although it is difficult to determine whether the increase in minority 
enrollment is due to population growth in California, the enrollment of whites 
showed the lowest growth compared to underrepresented minorities from the 
time its percentage plan went into effect.  
Due to Florida’s Talented 20 program’s recent implementation and lack of 
centralized data collection, limited data exists regarding Florida’s admission 
rates.
100
  A search of the State University System of Florida shows the 
following results, compiled from data aggregated through a customized search 
using an interactive search tool:
101
 
                                                                                                                 
 99. UNIV. OF CAL., STATISTICAL SUMMARY: FALL 2012, supra note 20, at 27 tbl.7k. 
 100. HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 44. 
 101. Fall Enrollment in State University System Institutions, ST. U. SYS. FLA. BOARD 
GOVERNORS, http://www.flbog.edu/resources/iud/enrollment_search.php (select “2007” for Show 
ten (10) years prior to and “ALL” for 2 digit CIP Code, then follow “continue” hyperlink; then 
select “ALL” for 6 digit CIP Code and follow “continue” hyperlink; then select “ALL” for all 
search queries and follow “continue” hyperlink; then select “ALL” for all search queries and 
follow “continue” hyperlink; then select “Race”) (last visited Sept. 26, 2014) (displaying 2002-
2011 fall enrollment data by race for the State University System of Florida). 
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Table 2 
 Enrollment for 
fall 1998 
(before the 
racial ban) 
Enrollment 
for fall 1999 
Enrollment 
for fall 2011 
Percentage 
change in 
enrollment 
from fall 
1998 to 
2011 
Asian 9,212 9,674 14,975 62.56% 
Black 31,413 33,002 45,069 43.47% 
Hispanic 30,792 32,769 70,368 128.53% 
Native 
American 
795 820 984 23.77% 
NonRes 
Alien 
8,506 9,635 13,784 62.05% 
White 142,231 145,382 172,879 21.55% 
Pacific 
Island 
0 0 472  
Multiple 0 0 5,581  
 
As the table shows, the enrollment of minorities within Florida’s State 
University System increased from the academic years beginning in fall 1998 
and fall 1999, the years before the ban on racial preferences, to fall 2011.  
Therefore, percentage plans in all three states regained or exceeded 
underrepresented minority enrollment prior to the states’ ban on racial 
admissions becoming effective. 
Moreover, at the University of California, Berkeley (Berkeley) and the 
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), underrepresented minority 
enrollment either remained steady from pre-Prop. 209 levels or exceeded 
diversity levels when racial admissions were used.
102
  A comparison of 
enrollment at Berkeley in 1997 (the last year that schools used race-based 
admissions) with enrollment rates in 1998 (the first year Prop. 209 became 
effective) shows a drop in white enrollment from 35.2% to 29.2% and in Asian 
                                                 
 102. HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 36 tbl.12. 
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enrollment from 40.9% to 37.1%.
103
  Hispanic enrollment at Berkeley 
remained the same at 12.2%, while African American enrollment was 
relatively stable, changing from 4.9% to 4.8%.
104
  Similarly, white enrollment 
rates at UCLA dropped from 34% to 28.9%, and Asian enrollment fell from 
41.3% to 37.2%.
105
  Similar to Berkeley, the enrollment for African Americans 
and Hispanics at UCLA remained steady, changing from 4.9% to 4.3% and 
from 13.9% to 13.6%, respectively.
106
  In 2001, four years after Prop. 209’s 
implementation, white and Asian enrollment continued to decline at both 
UCLA and Berkeley compared to 1997 (the year before Prop. 209 was 
enacted), whereas African American enrollment remained steady, and Hispanic 
enrollment increased.
107
  Comparatively, at the University of Florida, the levels 
of diversity remained relatively stable between 2000, the year before Florida’s 
ban on racial admissions, and 2001, when the ban was implemented.
108
  During 
the same time frame at Florida State University, white enrollment dropped, 
African American and Asian enrollments were steady, and Hispanic 
enrollment increased by three percentage points.
109
  Percentage plans, 
therefore, can attain the same level of diversity for underrepresented minorities 
as race-based plans, even at premier institutions. 
However, percentage plan critics question the efficacy of percentage plans at 
achieving racial diversity at flagships schools.
110
  Some researchers point out 
that “[i]n . . . premier institutions [in Florida], . . . whites and Asians were 
overrepresented and blacks and Latinos highly underrepresented relative to the 
15- to 19-year old population of the state.”
111
  They similarly note that at 
UCLA and Berkeley, “blacks and Latinos [were] underrepresented relative to 
the 15- to 19-year old population.”
112
 
Any objection to a percentage plan based upon the premise that the levels of 
diversity do not mirror the general population is irrelevant and 
                                                 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 37 tbl.13. 
 109. Id. 
 110. The University of Texas at Austin, ranked fifty-second among the nation’s top colleges 
and universities, and Texas A&M, ranked sixty-ninth, are Texas’s flagship universities.  National 
University Rankings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://colleges.usnews.rankings 
andreviews.com/best-colleges/rankings/national-universities/spp+50 (last visited Sept. 26, 2014).  
Berkeley and UCLA are California’s premier institutions.  Berkeley is ranked twentieth nationally 
and UCLA is ranked twenty-third.  Id.  The University of Florida, ranked forty-ninth, and the 
Florida State University, ranked ninety-first, are Florida’s flagship universities. Id. 
 111. HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 36. 
 112. Id.  at 35. 
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unconstitutional.  In order to obtain the educational benefits of diversity, 
colleges and universities may aspire to attain a critical mass of minority 
students.  Critical mass is defined as the number of minorities needed to 
“encourage[] underrepresented minority students to participate in the 
classroom and not feel isolated.”
113
  Critical mass can be achieved, even when 
diversity levels at the school do not reach levels similar to the general 
population.  As long as there is a critical mass of minorities, minorities can feel 
engaged in the classroom without being among a student body as diverse as the 
population. 
Criticisms about the disparity between levels of diversity in the population 
and the student body of a university imply that a program that results in student 
diversity levels unequal to the population is unsuccessful.
114
  However, such a 
call to reach population levels for underrepresented minorities borders on 
insistence for racial balancing.  Thus, designing admissions procedures for the 
purpose of reflecting a population’s diversity would violate the Court’s 
prohibition on racial balancing.
115
  In Croson, the Court invalidated a quota 
because it was not narrowly tailored to any goal except racial balancing.
116
  
The Court emphasized that it is “completely unrealistic” to expect that 
“minorities will choose a particular trade in lockstep proportion to their 
representation in the local population.”
117
  It is similarly unrealistic that 
minorities will enroll in a particular university in exact proportion to the state’s 
minority population.  As the Court previously stated, 
This working backward to achieve a particular type of racial balance, 
rather than working forward from some demonstration of the level of 
diversity that provides the purported benefits, is a fatal flaw under 
our existing precedent.  We have many times over reaffirmed that 
“[r]acial balance is not to be achieved for its own sake.”
118
 
Additionally, percentage plan opponents are concerned that students who 
rank, for example, within the top ten percent, and thus are guaranteed 
admission to a university, may not be as qualified as other students who attend 
more academically challenging high schools but rank below the top ten percent 
                                                 
 113. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 318 (2003). 
 114. See Gaertner & Hart, supra note 23, at 372 (“The educational mission of colleges and 
universities includes a commitment to prepare their graduates to lead in diverse workplaces in a 
complex society.  To effectively achieve this goal, schools must ensure that they serve a 
population whose diversity bears some connection to the diversity of . . . society . . . .”). 
 115. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 729–30 
(2007). 
 116. Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 468, 507 (1989). 
 117. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 118. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 729–30 (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494 
(1992)). 
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of their class.
119
  A comparative analysis of the academic performance of 
students admitted through a percentage plan to those admitted outside of the 
plan, however, appears to rebut this presumption.
120
  In one study, researchers 
found that the average freshman year GPA of students admitted to the 
University of Texas outside of the percentage plan was 2.90, compared to 3.24 
for students admitted through the percentage plan.
121
 
Percentage plans that require students to take specific courses can also help 
control the extent a student’s GPA and class rank are affected by the rigor of 
the student’s course load.  The University of California (UC) system, for 
example, calculates GPA based on seven different subject areas, known as a-g 
courses, and awards additional credit toward the GPA calculation for honors 
and Advanced Placement courses.
122
  By requiring a-g courses, California’s 
percentage plan removes the incentive for students to enroll in less challenging 
high school courses.  However, the disadvantage of this approach is that it 
exacerbates the socioeconomic disparity among schools.  The fifteen required 
college-prep courses considered in the UC system’s GPA calculation are less 
likely to be available in schools located in disadvantaged neighborhoods.
123
  
Notably, as a result of litigation, California recently sought to remedy the 
disparate availability of college preparatory and advanced placement classes 
among its high schools.
124
 
Critics also argue that percentage plans fail to address the systemic racial 
barriers facing minorities.
125
  However, percentage plans may offer an 
                                                 
 119. See HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 18; Michelle Adams, Isn’t It Ironic? The Central 
Paradox at the Heart of “Percentage Plans,” 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1729, 1731 (2001); Eboni S. 
Nelson, What Price Grutter?  We May Have Won the Battle, but Are We Losing the War?, 32 J.C. 
& U.L. 1, 35 (2005). 
 120. See Nelson, supra note 119, at 35 (citing LAVERGNE & WALKER, IMPLEMENTATION, 
supra note 20, at 3). 
 121. LAVERGNE & WALKER, IMPLEMENTATION, supra note 20, at 3. 
 122. Jennifer M. Chacón, Race as a Diagnostic Tool: Latinas/os and Higher Education in 
California, Post 209, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1215, 1228 (2008). 
 123. Id. 
 124. See generally Alan E. Schoenfeld, Note, Challenging the Bounds of Education 
Litigation: Castaneda v. Regents and Daniel v. California, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 195 (2004) 
(discussing the effects of two cases on equalizing educational resources, particularly college 
preparatory and Advanced Placement courses, in disadvantaged schools).  Texas and Florida offer 
incentive programs to encourage schools to offer Advanced Placement courses.  U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ACHIEVING DIVERSITY, supra note 18, at 9.  In Florida, 
teachers receive a fifty dollar bonus for each student scoring three and above on Advanced 
Placement exams, and $500 if they have at least one student in underperforming schools who 
score three or higher.  Id.  The College Board observed that “Florida is now the leader in the 
number of black students taking advanced placement courses.”  Id. 
 125. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 119, at 1735, 1772 (discussing percentage plans’ failure to 
address racial segregation). 
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advantage beyond race-based programs that rely on traditional standards of 
merit such as standardized test scores and GPAs.  The advantage of percentage 
plans is that they change the metric for determining merit from standardized 
scores to long-term performance in high school.  To some extent, percentage 
plans equalize the opportunities for underrepresented minorities to compete for 
college admissions by eliminating reliance on SAT and ACT performance.  
The plans assure that students with GPAs and test scores that normally cannot 
compete with the greater pool of applicants
126
 have the opportunity to attend 
college because they compete in a smaller pool of applicants with the same 
educational opportunities.
127
  Percentage plans open doors for students who 
attend high schools in districts that are not feeder schools for colleges.
128
 
A related criticism of percentage plans is that they do not serve students who 
need it most.
129
  Percentage program critics are concerned about the 
“creaming” effect; only the most affluent students will rise to the top, even 
those students from disadvantaged schools.
130
  Princeton University Professor 
Marta Tienda found that those accepted through the Texas Top Ten Percent 
Plan would have been admitted without the program, and that the percentage 
plan fails to help Hispanic and African American students graduating in the top 
twenty percent and thirty percent of their class gain admission at Texas A&M 
and UT Austin.
131
 
Likewise, a study of Florida’s percentage plan found that a majority of the 
students who benefitted from the program did not need it to gain admission 
                                                 
 126. Studies show African Americans, Hispanics, and low-income students score the lowest 
on those standardized tests.  Walker & Lavergne, What We Learned in Texas, supra note 21, at 
20. 
 127. See Nelson, supra note 119, at 37 (noting that percentage plans provide more 
educational opportunities for minorities). 
 128. Gerald Torres, Grutter v. Bollinger/Gratz v. Bollinger: View From a Limestone Ledge, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 1596, 1602 (2003). 
 129. C.f. Deborah C. Malamud, Assessing Class-Based Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 452, 458 (1997) [hereinafter Malamud, Assessing] (“[A]ffirmative action programs tend to 
benefit the best-off among those who have been deemed sufficiently disadvantaged to be eligible 
for affirmative action.”). 
 130. See, e.g., Gaertner & Hart, supra note 23, at 375 (citing Anthony P. Carnevale & 
Stephen J. Rose, Socioeconomic Status, Race/Ethnicity, and Selective College Admissions, in 
AMERICA’S UNTAPPED RESOURCE: LOW-INCOME STUDENTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 101, 150–
51 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2004) [hereinafter Carnevale & Rose, Socioeconomic Status]; 
Malamud, Assessing, supra note 129, at 458). 
 131. Tienda & Niu, supra note 87, at 731–32; Press Release, Princeton Univ., Study: Tex. 
“10 Percent Plan” Fails to Sustain Diversity at Flagship Univs. (Jan. 23, 2003), available at 
http://www.princeton.edu/pr/news/03/q1/0123-tienda.htm. 
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into Florida’s college and university system.
132
  The study found that in 2000 
and 2001, only 150 and 177 students, respectively, benefited from the Talented 
20 program because they had a GPA below 3.0, the necessary GPA for 
“regular system-wide admission consideration.”
133
  A simulation study of the 
potential impact of California’s percentage plan showed a more positive effect 
in California: “between 60 and 65 percent of students in the top 4 percent 
already met current UC eligibility criteria.”
134
 
The problem with these studies is that they focus on the minimum eligibility 
criteria of the state university systems, and ignore the fact that, prior to 
percentage plans, students competed based on their grades and standardized 
test scores.  Percentage plans potentially help those students who perform 
poorly on standardized tests, and those individuals often belong to 
underrepresented minorities.
135
  When colleges eliminate standardized scores 
                                                 
 132. HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 43 (citing PATRICIA MARIN & EDGAR K. LEE, THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., APPEARANCE AND REALITY IN THE SUNSHINE STATE: 
THE TALENTED 20 PROGRAM IN FLORIDA 22–23 (2003)). 
 133. HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 43.  See also Mark C. Long, Race and College 
Admissions: An Alternative to Affirmative Action?, 86 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1020, 1032 (2004) 
(finding that Florida’s percentage plan only affected “4% [of applicants] . . . denied by all of the 
Florida public colleges to which they applied”). 
 134. HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 43. 
 135. In 2013, the College Board reported the following mean SAT scores by ethnicity in 
critical reading, mathematics, and writing: 
 
Ethnicity Reading Mathematics Writing 
American 
Indian or 
Alaska 
Native 
480 486 461 
Asian, Asian 
American 
521 597 527 
Black or 
African 
American 
431 429 418 
Mexican or 
Mexican 
American 
449 464 442 
Puerto Rican 456 453 445 
Other 
Hispanic 
450 461 443 
White 527 534 515 
 
THE COLL. BD., 2013 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS: TOTAL GROUP PROFILE REPORT 3 tbl.8 
(2013).  See also Walker & Lavergne, What We Learned in Texas, supra note 21 (“There is 
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from admissions criteria, the schools “reaffirm[] the superiority of 
performance-based over test-based merit criteria.”
136
 
Another concern with implementing percentage programs is that they 
depend on the racial and economic segregation of high schools.
137
  In fact, 
percentage plans may succeed in Texas, California, and Florida as a result of 
the racial segregation of schools in those states.
138
  It might take considerable 
time before the problem of racially segregated schools is remedied.
139
  In the 
interim, because percentage plans increase the possibility for minority students 
attending segregated schools to attend college, critics should embrace 
percentage plans as one targeted solution to a broader systemic problem.  
Although percentage plans are “by no means a national panacea, [they] offer[] 
a useful example of experimental and democratic decision making that 
changed admissions practices to expand opportunities for structural 
mobility.”
140
 
A final argument against percentage plans is that the Supreme Court has 
never required them.  Although the Grutter Court dismissed the suggestion of 
percentage plans as an alternative to affirmative action,
141
 the concerns that 
troubled the Court have since largely been addressed.  The Court did not 
require the adoption of percentage plans because it was apprehensive that 
“these alternatives would require a dramatic sacrifice of diversity, the 
academic quality of all admitted students, or both.”
142
  As studies show, 
                                                                                                                 
overwhelming evidence that African American, Hispanic, and low-income students do not score 
as well on standardized tests as do white and high-income students.”). 
 136. Tienda & Niu, supra note 87, at 732. 
 137. See Adams, supra note 119, at 1734 (discussing the relationship of percentage plans to 
segregated schools). 
 138. As of 2003, “[o]n average, whites in Texas, California, and Florida are in schools 
comprised of 66, 58, and 69 percent whites, respectively, making them the most isolated 
racial/ethnic group.”  HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 27. 
 139. Professor David Orentlicher suggests that percentage plans may provide an unintended 
benefit through the spill-over effect.  See Adams, supra note 119, at 1775 (citing David 
Orentlicher, Affirmative Action and Texas’ Ten Percent Solution: Improving Diversity and 
Quality, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 181, 181–82 (1998)).  He projects that parents might move 
their children to less rigorous schools to provide their children a competitive edge, and in doing 
so, schools in disadvantaged neighborhoods might benefit financially and politically from the 
migration of wealthier students.  Id. 
 140. Lani Guinier, Comment, Admissions Rituals As Political Acts: Guardians at the Gates 
of our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 217 (2003). 
 141. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 340 (2003). 
 142. Id.  The concerns over diversity and academic quality would have been more relevant to 
the suggested lottery system than to percentage plans as a race-neutral alternative.  See id. 
(discussing the use of lottery systems).  At the time the Court decided Grutter, there was evidence 
available regarding the Berkeley School of Law’s (Boalt Hall’s) success in implementing a race-
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however, percentage plans jeopardize neither diversity nor academic quality.
143
  
To the contrary, studies demonstrate that diversity levels can reach or exceed 
levels attained through racial admissions,
144
 and that students who are accepted 
through percentage plans outperform other students.
145
  Researchers found that 
even at UT Austin, students admitted under the percentage plan “not only 
outperform their lower-ranked counterparts with test scores 200-300 points 
higher, but they also defy predictions that high-achieving students from 
underperforming schools are destined for failure because they are ill-prepared 
for college level work.”
146
  As the President of UT Austin attests, “students in 
the top 10 percent of their high school class make much higher grades in 
college than those who weren’t in the top 10 percent.”
147
 
The Grutter Court also noted the concern that percentage plans preclude 
universities from performing individualized reviews to attain diverse 
students.
148
  But individualized assessments are not required for race-neutral 
programs; they are only necessary when race is a factor.  Also, the use of 
percentage plans is not mutually exclusive of programs that incorporate a 
holistic review of an applicant.  Texas, in the period after Hopwood’s racial 
ban and before Grutter, implemented two admissions systems at different 
times: one based on high school rank and one based on individualized review 
                                                                                                                 
neutral admissions program, which the University of Michigan Law School apparently ignored.  
Justice Thomas noted that 
[t]he sky has not fallen at Boalt Hall . . . . Prior to [Prop.] 209’s [constitutional 
amendment], which bars the State from “grant[ing] preferential treatment . . . on the 
basis of race . . . in the operation of . . . public education,” Boalt Hall enrolled 20 blacks 
and 28 Hispanics in its first-year class for 1996.  In 2002, without deploying express 
racial discrimination in admissions, Boalt’s entering class enrolled 14 blacks and 36 
Hispanics.  Total underrepresented minority student enrollment at Boalt Hall now 
exceeds 1996 levels.  Apparently the [University of Michigan] Law School cannot be 
counted on to be as resourceful.  The Court is willfully blind to the very real experience 
in California and elsewhere, which raises the inference that institutions with 
“reputation[s] for excellence[]” rivaling the Law School’s have satisfied their sense of 
mission without resorting to prohibited racial discrimination. 
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 367 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citations 
omitted). 
 143. See, e.g., Tienda & Niu, supra note 87, at 732. 
 144. See supra Part II.A. 
 145. See, e.g., Tienda & Niu, supra note 87, at 732. 
 146. Tienda & Niu, supra note 87, at 732 (citation omitted). 
 147. Larry R. Faulkner, “Top 10 Percent" Helps Students, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, 
Oct.-25,-2000,,-http://www.texastop10.princeton.edu/publicity/general/San%20Antonio 
%20EN.10.25.00.pdf.  See also Larry R. Faulkner, Class Rank Predicts Student Success, -USA 
TODAY,-Apr.-5,-2002,-http://www.texastop10.princeton.edu/publicity/general/USA%20Today.04 
05.05,-pdf. 
 148. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 340 (2003).  See also Laycock, supra note 71, at 
1818 (noting percentage plans’ effect on individualized review). 
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without regard to race.
149
  Texas’s race-neutral multivariate model took into 
account standardized SAT/ACT scores, high school curriculum, essays, 
leadership qualities, extracurricular activities, geography, characteristics of the 
high school, awards and honors, work experience, community service, and 
special family circumstances such as socioeconomic status and responsibilities 
for the family.
150
 
In fact, the lack of individualized assessment is one of the advantages of 
percentage plans, as they allow institutions to save money by avoiding the 
administrative costs of individualized reviews.  For example, when the 
University of Michigan implemented its holistic review of applications in 
response to Grutter, it expected to hire twenty additional personnel as 
application readers and counselors, with an expected cost of $1.5 to $2 million 
dollars, a thirty-three percent increase in the University’s standard operating 
costs.
151
 
Moreover, universities and colleges have long employed race-neutral 
admissions programs without individualized review.
152
  As Justice Thomas 
previously observed, “[T]here is nothing ancient, honorable, or constitutionally 
protected about ‘selective’ admissions.”
153
  Prior to selective admissions, 
universities customarily relied on certificate programs in which students were 
offered admission into a graduate school if they completed course work in a 
certified secondary school.
154
  Entrance exams later replaced the certificate 
program, but the “‘percent plans’ now used in Texas, California, and Florida 
are in many ways the descendants of the certificate system.”
155
 
B.  Socioeconomic Status: Class-Based Affirmative Action 
Class-based affirmative action, which admits students on the basis of their 
socioeconomic status, is a second race-neutral option that colleges and 
universities should explore.  Research has identified socioeconomic status
156
 as 
                                                 
 149. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415–16 (2013) (describing Texas’s evolving 
admissions program in response to Hopwood and Grutter). 
 150. Id.; Tienda & Niu, supra note 87, at 715. 
 151. Greg Winter, U. of Michigan Alters Admission Use of Race, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2003, 
at A12. 
 152. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 368 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 368–69 (explaining the history of certificate programs for graduate schools). 
 155. Id. at 369 (citation omitted). 
 156. Some scholars use “class” and “socioeconomic status” interchangeably.  Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig & Amber Fricke, Class, Classes, and Classic Race-Baiting: What’s in a 
Definition?, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 807, 808–09 (2011).  Others consider “class” and 
“socioeconomic status” distinct in that “class” means one’s economic or social status whereas 
“socioeconomic status” necessarily contemplates one’s race.  Id. at 809. 
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a salient factor in performance on standardized tests;
157
 a link is visible as early 
as primary school and carries through high school.
158
  Studies show that low-
income students lag behind their more economically advantaged peers in 
reading and math: only fourteen percent of low-income fourth graders are 
proficient in reading, as compared to forty-one percent of their economically 
advantaged cohorts, and nine percent of low-income fourth graders are 
proficient in math, as compared to thirty-three percent of their economically 
advantaged peers.
159
 
Additionally, researchers Anthony Carnevale and Jeff Strohl discovered that 
low socioeconomic status was a prevalent predictor of low SAT scores.
160
  
Coming from a low socioeconomic background impacted students by 399 
points on the SAT, as compared with race (being African American as opposed 
to white), which had an average impact of fifty-six points.
161
  Georgetown 
University researchers found that the link between socioeconomic status and 
standardized test performance is “seven times as significant as racial ones.”
162
 
Despite the significant impact socioeconomic status has on students’ 
performance on standardized tests, which affects students’ college admissions, 
studies show that elite schools do little to compensate for socioeconomic status 
when making admission decisions.
163
  A survey of nineteen law schools by 
Professor Richard Sander shows those schools provided no admission 
preference for students having parents with lower education backgrounds (an 
                                                 
 157. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, ACHIEVING DIVERSITY, supra 
note 18, at 6. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. (citing NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, THE 
NATION’S REPORT CARD: MATHEMATICS 2000 60–61 (2001)). 
 160. Kahlenberg, Reflections, supra note 22, at 724. 
 161. Id. (citing Carnevale & Strohl, Increasing College Access, supra note 22, at 173).  In 
2013, there was a 388 point disparity between the average total SAT scores for students with 
family income less than $20,000 (435 mean score for critical reading, 462 mean for mathematics, 
and 429 mean for writing) and students coming from families with income more than $200,000 
(565 mean score for critical reading, 586 mean for mathematics, and 563 mean for writing).  
COLL. BD., 2013 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS: TOTAL GROUP PROFILE REPORT 4 tbl.11 (2013).  
This disparity has been consistent over the years.  In 2011 and 2012, the disparity between the 
two income groups resulted in a difference of 398 and 400 SAT points, respectively.  COLL. BD., 
2012 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS: TOTAL GROUP PROFILE REPORT 4 tbl.11 (2012); COLL. BD., 
2011 COLLEGE-BOUND SENIORS: TOTAL GROUP PROFILE REPORT 4 tbl.11 (2011).  See also 
Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Inevitable Irrelevance of Affirmative Action Jurisprudence, 39 J.C. & 
U.L. 1, 45–46 (2013) (discussing the College Board 2011 study). 
 162. Richard Kahlenberg, Online Fisher Symposium: In Defense of Race-Neutral Alternative 
Jurisprudence, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 11, 2012, 11:27 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/ 
online-fisher-symposium-in-defense-of-race-neutral-alternative-jurisprudence/. 
 163. See Richard H. Sander, Class In American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 631, 
656 (2011) [hereinafter Sander, Class in American Legal Education]. 
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indicator of low socioeconomic status).
164
  Similarly, Carnevale and scholar 
Stephen Rose found no socioeconomic status preference among the top 146 
undergraduate schools, compared with a three-fold racial preference.
165
  
Research by authors William Bowen, Martin Kurzweil, and Eugene Tobin also 
showed that students from low socioeconomic backgrounds received no 
preferences, whereas racial preferences accounted for 27.7 percentage 
points.
166
 
Thus, it is unsurprising that elite law schools have dismal enrollment 
numbers for students of low socioeconomic status.  Professor Sander found 
that low socioeconomic status students (the bottom quarter of the population) 
only represent about two percent of students at the top twenty law schools 
compared to over seventy-five percent of students from the wealthiest 
socioeconomic group (the top quartile of the population) who attend these elite 
law schools.
167
  Other researchers found similar trends at elite undergraduate 
schools as well.  Carnevale and Rose discovered that, of the students who 
attended the most selective 146 undergraduate colleges and universities, three 
percent represented the poorest socioeconomic quartile while seventy-four 
percent represented the most affluent.
168
  Among the general population of 
students entering postsecondary education from 1989 to 1990, researchers 
found that only fifteen percent of students were from families in the lowest 
socioeconomic quartile while forty percent of students came from the highest 
quartile.
169
 
Relatedly, minorities who benefit from race-based affirmative action come 
from the most affluent backgrounds.  According to Professor Sander’s study of 
elite law schools, eighty-nine percent of African Americans and sixty-three 
percent of Latinos admitted into those highly selective schools come from the 
top socioeconomic half of the population.
170
  Likewise, a study conducted by 
authors Derek Bok and William Bowen found that at twenty-eight elite 
colleges and universities, eighty-six percent of African Americans represented 
                                                 
 164. Id. at 655–57. 
 165. Kahlenberg, Reflections, supra note 22, at 721 (citing Carnevale & Rose, Socioeconomic 
Status, supra note 130, at 141–42, 148–49). 
 166. Kahlenberg, Reflections, supra note 22, at 721–22 (citing WILLIAM G. BOWEN, MARTIN 
A. KURZWEIL & EUGENE M. TOBIN, EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE IN AMERICAN HIGHER 
EDUCATION 105 tbl.5.1, 166 (2005)). 
 167. See Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 163, at 639 tbl.1. 
 168. See Kahlenberg, Reflections, supra note 22, at 719 (citing Carnevale & Rose, 
Socioeconomic Status, supra note 130, at 106 tbl.3.1). 
 169. PATRICK T. TERENZINI, ALBERTO F. CABRERA, & ELENA M. BERNAL, SWIMMING 
AGAINST THE TIDE: THE POOR IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION v (2001). 
 170. See Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 163, at 651 tbl.8. 
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middle or high socioeconomic status.
171
  The explanation for why few 
minorities are represented in the lower socioeconomic strata of the student 
body at elite schools is that “minorities are minorities”; in other words, there 
are more poor white students whose numbers, simply by being the majority, 
reduce the representative impact of poor minorities.
172
 
Although schools do little to give admissions preferences for students from 
low socioeconomic backgrounds, one would expect schools to provide 
significant financial aid to the few low-income students actually admitted.  
Yet, studies show elite schools provide more financial help to the wealthy.
173
  
Professor Sander’s research indicates that affluent whites receive twice the 
amount of grants and scholarships than low-income whites, and affluent 
African Americans receive four times that amount.
174
 
Recognizing the impact of socioeconomic status on university admissions 
rates and the failure of schools to compensate for socioeconomic status, some 
scholars have suggested designing socioeconomic status affirmative action 
programs to achieve diversity.
175
  An affirmative action program premised on 
socioeconomic status raises two questions: 1) Does achieving socioeconomic 
status diversity result in racial diversity?  2) Do students with low 
socioeconomic status enrich the educational environment, act as community or 
political leaders, act as role models, or provide community service?
176
 
The debate surrounding use of socioeconomic status as a factor, and proxy, 
for race centers on whether it sufficiently furnishes schools with racially 
diverse students or whether it should be embraced as a separate factor.
177
  
                                                 
 171. See Kahlenberg, Reflections, supra note 22, at 720–21 (citing WILLIAM G. BOWEN & 
DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN 
COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 341 tbl.B.2 (1998)). 
 172. Deborah C. Malamud, Class Privilege in Legal Education: A Response to Sander, 88 
DENV. U. L. REV. 729, 732 (2011) [hereinafter Malamud, Class Privilege]. 
 173. See Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 163, at 661 tbl.12. 
 174. See id. 
 175. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Economic Disadvantage, 
43 UCLA L. REV. 1913, 1930 (1996); Richard H. Sander, Experimenting with Class-Based 
Affirmative Action, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 472, 473 (1997) [hereinafter Sander, Experimenting].  For 
criticisms of socioeconomic affirmative action programs, see William C. Kidder, Misshaping the 
River: Proposition 209 and Lessons for the Fisher Case, 39 J.C. & U.L. 53, 55–56 (2013); 
Deborah C. Malamud, A Response to Professor Sander, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 504, 504 (1997) 
[hereinafter Malamud, A Response]; Malamud, Class Privilege, supra note 172. 
 176. See Richard Lempert, Reflections on Class in American Legal Education, 88 DENV. U. 
L. REV. 683, 688 (2011) (expressing doubt about the contribution that students with low 
socioeconomic status can make in and outside of the classroom). 
 177. Kali Borkoski, Ask the Author: Richard Sander and Stuart Taylor, Jr. on Mismatch, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 16, 2012, 9:39 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/10/ask-the-author-
richard-sander-and-stuart-taylor-jr-on-mismatch/ (“The moral for our broader national debate is 
that SES [socioeconomic status] preferences work best if we value socioeconomic diversity for its 
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Race-based affirmative action advocates argue that socioeconomic status 
should not replace race consideration,
178
 but instead, work in conjunction with 
race
179
 because consideration of socioeconomic status alone does not provide 
sufficient racial diversity.
180
  One explanation scholars provide for the limited 
effectiveness of class-based programs is that socioeconomic status and 
minority membership are not perfectly correlated.
181
  Although twenty-five 
                                                                                                                 
own sake.”).  Some scholars advance socioeconomic affirmative action on meritocratic principles.  
See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 175, at 1934–51.  Others value socioeconomic diversity for more 
varied reasons: 
(1) Greater socioeconomic diversity in law schools can produce a richer education for 
all students, by making the range of experiences brought to law school closer to the 
“real” world. (2) Bringing more low-SES people into law school, and hence into the 
legal profession, confers more legitimacy on the profession and makes it better able to 
respond to the needs of the public. (3) Increased access to low-SES applicants actually 
improves the quality of the student body, because test scores and other admissions 
criteria understate the ability of low-SES applicants. (4) Helping low-SES people to 
enter higher education increases social mobility and thus helps, however modestly, to 
reduce poverty and increase equality. 
Sander, Experimenting, supra note 175, at 475. 
 178. Professor Douglas Laycock argues that any proxy for race is inherently less effective 
than considering race itself in admission decisions: 
Proxy selectors would be race-neutral admission criteria that benefit minority 
applicants disproportionately.  Such proxy selectors avoid the explicit consideration of 
race, but that is their only virtue.  In every other way, there are far inferior to the direct 
consideration of race.  They achieve far less diversity and do far more damage to 
admission standards.  This is for quite general reasons inherent in the basic approach. 
Laycock, supra note 71, at 1808. 
 179. Deirdre M. Bowen, Meeting Across the River: Why Affirmative Action Needs Race & 
Class Diversity, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 751, 787 (2011). 
 180. Gaertner & Hart, supra note 23, at 377 (citing Mark C. Long, Affirmative Action and Its 
Alternatives in Public Universities: What Do We Know?, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 315, 321–23 
(2007)); T. Vance McMahan & Don R. Willett, Hope from Hopwood: Charting a Positive Civil 
Rights Course for Texas and the Nation, 10 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 163, 166–67 (1999) (“[A] 
study released by the Coordinating Board’s Advisory Committee on Criteria for Diversity, a 
group of sociologists and demographers from Texas schools, found that any criteria besides race 
would affect only half the number of minorities helped by affirmative action programs.”). 
 181. Bowen, supra note 179, at 754 (“[D]ata indicat[es] that class and race are not 
interchangeable.”); Gaertner & Hart, supra note 23, at 378 (citing Thomas J. Espenshade & 
Chang Y. Chung, The Opportunity Cost of Admission Preferences at Elite Universities, 86 SOC. 
SCI. Q. 293, 296–303 (2005)); Michael A. Olivas, Constitutional Criterion: The Social Science 
and Common Law of Admissions Decisions in Higher Education, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1065, 
1095, 1117 (1997) (“There is no good proxy, no more narrowly tailored criterion, no statistical 
treatment that can replace race.”); Richard H. Sander, A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action 
in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 468–78 (2004).  Paradoxically, if there is a 
strong correlation between race and socioeconomic status, the question that schools must confront 
is whether using socioeconomic status will be challenged as a proxy.  Professor Laycock surmises 
that “the stronger a proxy’s correlation with race, the more likely it is to be challenged as a 
sham.”  Laycock, supra note 71, at 1810. 
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percent of Hispanics and African Americans live in poverty,
182
 by virtue of 
being a majority, there are more whites that are impoverished.
183
 
The effectiveness of class-based programs depends on how a school defines 
economic disadvantage.  One definition is simply to focus on the applicant’s 
parents’ income.
184
  Another method is to consider parents’ income, education, 
and occupation.
185
  A third approach evaluates those factors, but also whether 
the applicant attends a disadvantaged school, lives in a poor neighborhood, and 
comes from a single-parent household.
186
  A fourth, more comprehensive, 
option is to define socioeconomic status by the preceding factors and wealth.
187
 
Measuring socioeconomic status in its broadest form is the best solution to 
increase diversity.
188
  Some argue wealth should be included in the 
determination of socioeconomic status because wealth can access education 
and facilitate social networks.
189
  Further, research suggests that wealth is an 
important consideration because when wealth and other socioeconomic factors 
are controlled, the racial disparity in educational outcomes, like high school 
and college graduation, is less visible.
190
 
When properly defined, socioeconomic affirmative action programs are 
successful at achieving diversity.  One study shows that using socioeconomic 
status as a boost can increase underrepresented minority enrollment even more 
than race-based programs alone.
191
  The University of Colorado at Boulder 
investigated the effects of class-based affirmative action at a “moderately 
selective” university using admission decisions rather than enrollment 
decisions.
192
  The study found that class-based admission criteria increased the 
                                                 
 182. Bowen, supra note 179, at 766.  See also Lempert, supra note 176, at 690 & n.17 
(suggesting “wealth may be the most important indicator of a family’s social class”). 
 183. Many scholars have made this observation.  See, e.g., TERENZINI, CABRERA & BERNAL, 
supra note 169, at 3; Malamud, Assessing, supra note 129, at 465. 
 184. Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1037, 1074–
75 (1996) [hereinafter Kahlenberg, Class-Based].  Using income as the sole metric of 
socioeconomic status has engendered debate regarding the benefits and disadvantages of defining 
socioeconomic status narrowly or broadly.  See id. (discussing the various ways socioeconomic 
status can be measured).  Professor Deborah Malamud cautions that defining socioeconomic 
status too broadly may dilute the classroom presence of minorities and those most economically 
disadvantaged.  See Sander, Experimenting, supra note 175, at 501–02 (addressing Professor 
Malamud’s critique of class-based affirmative action). 
 185. Kahlenberg, Class-Based, supra note 184, at 1074–78. 
 186. Id. at 1078–82. 
 187. Id. at 1074. 
 188. Id. at 1083. 
 189. Bowen, supra note 179, at 770–71. 
 190. See Kahlenberg, Class-Based, supra note 184, at 1083. 
 191. Gaertner & Hart, supra note 23, at 386–70, 397–98. 
 192. Id. at 369–70. 
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admission rates for African Americans, Latinos, and Native Americans more 
than race-based programs did.
193
  The researchers explained this unexpected 
finding: “The class-based approach at [the subject university] is comparatively 
privileged in this context.  Under the [study’s] Disadvantage and 
Overachievement Indices, identification can grant primary factor 
consideration.  Under race-conscious affirmative action at [the university], 
[underrepresented minority] status is always a secondary factor.”
194
  As this 
study reveals, the success of a class-based program with increasing racial 
diversity depends on how much weight universities afford socioeconomic 
status.
195
  Professor Richard Sander recommends that socioeconomic status 
receive equal consideration as race.
196
 
Class-based programs at three University of California law schools have also 
increased racial diversity.
197
  Responding to Prop. 209’s ban on race 
considerations in 1996, California’s undergraduate and graduate schools were 
forced to implement race-neutral programs.
198
  Using class-based affirmative 
action, Hispanic enrollment in California’s law schools increased from 7.2% in 
1997 (before Prop. 209 became effective) to 11.9% in 2003, and African-
American enrollment increased from 1.9% to 4.7% in the same years.
199
 
Another class-based study at the UCLA School of Law found that adjusting 
for socioeconomic status could bring increased racial diversity.
200
  When 
UCLA Law School implemented its socioeconomic affirmative action 
program, although the percentage of black and American Indian enrollment 
fell,
201
 when fluctuations in applications were taken into account, Latino 
enrollment remained steady and underrepresented Asian American enrollment 
increased.
202
  Overall, “minority groups benefitted disproportionately from the 
                                                 
 193. Id. at 392. 
 194. Id. at 393. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Sander, Experimenting, supra note 175, at 476.  More selective schools provide greater 
weight to race.  Gaertner & Hart, supra note 23, at 399 (“At many selective private and public 
schools, the admissions boost for minority status is quite large.”).  In law schools, the top ten 
schools employ “the most aggressive use of affirmative action.”  Bowen, supra note 179, at 768.  
See also Nelson, supra note 119, at 26 (suggesting affirmative action programs should be 
broadened). 
 197. Nelson, supra note 119, at 18, 22. 
 198. Id. at 18. 
 199. Id. 
 200. See Sander, Experimenting, supra note 175, at 473 (describing UCLA Law School’s 
class-based affirmative action program). 
 201. See id. at 497 n.46 (suggesting one reason for the decline in African American and 
American Indian enrollment was due to the decline of applications). 
 202. Id. at 473. 
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class-based preferences.”
203
  Fifty-five percent of the students admitted to the 
UCLA Law School received a socioeconomic status preference, and among 
these admits, the school’s acceptance rates for African American and Latino 
applicants were particularly high.
204
  In addition to attaining racial diversity, 
UCLA Law School’s program reached new academic heights.  In 2000, 
students who were part of the entering class that benefited from a 
socioeconomic preference achieved the highest bar passage rate in the school’s 
history.
205
 
At the undergraduate level, underrepresented minority school enrollment in 
California increased from eighteen percent in 1997 to twenty-four percent in 
2008.
206
  Although enrollment of underrepresented minorities at Berkeley and 
UCLA, two of California’s most elite public undergraduate institutions, 
suffered the year following Prop. 209’s enactment, their minority enrollment 
has grown to twenty percent under class-based affirmative action, compared 
with twenty-three percent under race-based affirmative action.
207
  The elite 
University of Michigan Law School considered an increase from 13.55% to 
20.1% minority students in its entering class a “critical mass,”
208
 and thus a 
successful program.  Therefore, by the University of Michigan Law School’s 
standard, these socioeconomic status programs have largely been successful. 
Putting aside the debate on how socioeconomic status should be 
operationalized,
209
 studies show that preferences for socioeconomic status “can 
achieve racial diversity.”
210
  The success of class-based programs depends on 
                                                 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 486. 
 205. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 163, at 663. 
 206. Kahlenberg, Reflections, supra note 22, at 724. 
 207. Id. (citing Tongshan Chang & Heather Rose, A Portrait of Underrepresented Minorities 
at the University of California, 1994-2008, in EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION: THE 
PAST AND FUTURE OF CALIFORNIA’S PROPOSITION 209 83, 84–89 (Eric Grodsky & Michal 
Kurlaender eds., 2010)). 
 208. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 389–90 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); 
Kahlenberg, Reflections, supra note 22, at 726. 
 209. Professor Malamud argues for a broader conception of economic impact beyond wealth 
and income because when black students’ performance on tests are affected by stereotype threats, 
“something ‘economic’ has taken place.”  Malamud, A Response, supra note 175, at 508.  
Therefore, she concludes that “no program of class-based affirmative action can hope to capture 
the ways in which race exacerbates economic disadvantage and stands in the way of the full 
enjoyment of economic privilege.”  Id. at 509.  Professor Malamud explains, “The reason is that 
being black in America compounds economic disadvantage, undercuts economic progress, and 
depresses academic performance in ways too profound and too complex for any reasonable race-
blind system to capture.”  Id. 
 210. Id. at 509. 
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the magnitude of the socioeconomic status preference
211
 and the breadth of 
measuring socioeconomic status.
212
 
Institutions may be tempted to reject socioeconomic status programs because 
a particular school’s diversity success might be due to its unique 
circumstances.  For example, UCLA Law School’s success at attaining 
diversity, while relying solely on socioeconomic status, was attributed to the 
unique circumstance of California’s “substantial number of low-
[socioeconomic status], high-achieving Asian students, many of them 
immigrants or the children of immigrants.”
213
  Although there may be unique 
circumstances that make some socioeconomic-based programs successful in 
some places, Fisher’s mandate that schools use workable race-neutral 
alternatives puts the burden on schools to justify why a class-based program 
would be unworkable.  While UCLA’s decision to exclude wealth as part of 
the socioeconomic status calculation can be criticized,
214
 if wealth had been 
part of the calculus, UCLA’s program would have attained even greater 
diversity because African Americans have significantly less wealth than whites 
with the same income level.
215
  The University of California at Los Angeles 
Law School’s achievement of a diverse entering class without considering 
wealth further supports the potential of socioeconomic affirmative action 
programs as a race-neutral alternative.  Schools need to study existing 
programs and critically assess what characteristics of the program and the 
state’s population make it unlikely that the school can successfully implement 
a similar socioeconomic program. 
As part of its consideration, schools should weigh the costs of a 
socioeconomic affirmative action program.  Perhaps the greatest burden on 
schools undertaking a socioeconomic affirmative action program will be the 
financial cost.  Although UCLA’s operating costs were minimally affected by 
integrating socioeconomic status into its admissions program, its financial aid 
system could have been greatly impacted.
216
  Anticipating that the school 
                                                 
 211. Socioeconomic affirmative action programs’ success at achieving diversity compared 
with that of race-based programs depends largely on how much preference is given to race.  
Professor Sander explains that 
[w]hat varied was the size of the old racial preference; the greater the traditional 
preference, the less effectively class worked as a “substitute” for race.  How the class-
for-race tradeoffs would operate in other schools or other contexts, then, depends on the 
magnitude of current racial preferences in those settings. 
Sander, Experimenting, supra note 175, at 473. 
 212. See Malamud, A Response, supra note 175, at 511. 
 213. Sander, Class in American Legal Education, supra note 163, at 663 n.89. 
 214. See Malamud, A Response, supra note 175, at 507 (providing a critical analysis of the 
UCLA Law School’s socioeconomic admissions program). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Sander, Experimenting, supra note 175, at 499. 
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would need to provide larger financial grants if it increased the enrollment of 
students from lower income families, UCLA “scaled down its grant levels 
enough to offset the higher burdens.”
217
  As UCLA’s program demonstrates, a 
school must be earnest in finding solutions to support its socioeconomic 
affirmative action program.
218
  Therefore, in order to show that socioeconomic 
preference is an unworkable race-neutral alternative, it is insufficient for 
schools to merely identify the costs; they must also explain why the costs are 
too burdensome and why they are unable to offset those costs in order to 
satisfy Fisher. 
C.  Legacy Preferences and Development Admits 
In addition to including neutral factors that correlate with racial/ethnic 
diversity, in order to comport with the narrowly tailored requirement, schools 
should eliminate legacy preferences that disproportionately help white students 
from privileged families or with alumni connections.
219
  Ninety-six percent of 
Ivy League alumni are white.
220
  In particular, at Harvard, legacy applicants 
enjoy a forty percent admission rate while only fifteen percent of non-legacy 
applicants are admitted.
221
  Similarly, in 2003, Princeton extended offers to 
thirty-five percent of legacy applicants compared with ten percent of overall 
applicants, the University of Pennsylvania admitted fifty-one percent of legacy 
applicants despite only admitting twenty-one percent of overall applicants, and 
Notre Dame extended legacy preferences to twenty-three percent of legacy 
applicants in 2003
222
 and fifty percent in 2005.
223
  Legacy preferences account 
                                                 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. (discussing how UCLA supported its socioeconomic affirmative action program by 
scaling down grant levels). 
 219. Kahlenberg, Race-Neutral Alternatives Work, supra note 25.  Daniel Golden of the Wall 
Street Journal has written a series of Pulitzer Prize-winning articles exposing the admissions 
advantages white students receive.  See Daniel Golden, At Many Colleges, the Rich Kids Get 
Affirmative Action, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 2003, at A1 [hereinafter Golden, Rich Kids]; Daniel 
Golden, Bill Would Make Colleges Report Legacies, Early Admissions, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 
2003, at B1; Daniel Golden, For Groton Grads, Academics Aren’t Only Keys to Ivies, WALL ST. 
J., Apr. 25, 2003, at A1 [hereinafter Golden, Groton Grads]; Daniel Golden, For Supreme Court, 
Affirmative Action Isn’t Just Academic, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2003, at A1; Daniel Golden, 
Preference for Alumni Children in College Admission Draws Fire, WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 2003, at 
A1 [hereinafter Golden, Draws Fire]. 
 220. Bowen, supra note 179, at 774 (citing TIM J. WISE, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: RACIAL 
PREFERENCE IN BLACK AND WHITE 122 (2005)). 
 221. Id. 
 222. Golden, Draws Fire, supra note 219.  Other universities similarly admit legacies at 
almost double, and sometimes more than double, the rate of their overall admissions, as 
demonstrated by the following chart compiled by researchers Steve Shadowen, Sozi Tulante, and 
Shara Alpern: 
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for ten to twenty-five percent of the student population at elite colleges and 
universities, compared with, for example, the California Institute of 
Technology, where there are no legacy preferences and only 1.5% of admitted 
students are children of alumni.
224
    
Although legacy applicants are generally admitted at higher rates, they are 
less qualified than other applicants
225
 and are outperformed by affirmative 
action students.
226
  A 1990 report by the United States Department of 
Education described Harvard legacy admits as “significantly less qualified” 
                                                                                                                 
School Year 
Overall Admit 
Rate (%) 
Legacy 
Admit 
Rate (%) 
Amherst 2005 20 50 
Bowdoin 1980 21 52 
Columbia 1993 32 51 
Dartmouth 1991 27 57 
Harvard 2002 11 40 
Middlebury 2006 27 45 
Notre Dame 2005 20 50 
Pennsylvania 2004 21 51 
Princeton 2002 10 35 
Stanford 2006 13 25 
Yale 2002 11 29 
 
Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 24, at 57 tbl.1.  See also Daniel Golden, An Analytic 
Survey of Legacy Preference, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE RICH: LEGACY PREFERENCES IN 
COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 71, 76 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2010) [hereinafter Golden, Analytic 
Survey] (detailing enrollment rates for legacies at top universities). 
 223. Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 24, at 57 tbl.1. 
 224. Kahlenberg, 10 Myths, supra note 26. 
 225. See Jodi S. Cohen et al., Clout Goes to College, CHI. TRIB., May 29, 2009, 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-uofi-clout,0,6326007.story [hereinafter Cohen et 
al., Clout] (“In 2008, for example, freshmen on average ranked in the [eighty-eighth] percentile in 
their high school class, while clouted students ranked in the [seventy-sixth] percentile.”). 
 226. Bowen, supra note 179, at 774–75.  A study by Duke Professor Kenneth Spenner and 
Duke graduate student Nathan D. Martin revealed that legacy applicants at Duke University were 
admitted despite having lower academic credentials compared to other applicants with parents 
who hold degrees from other colleges.  Scott Jaschik, Legacy Admits: More Money, Lower 
Scores,-INSIDE-HIGHER-ED-(Aug.-4,-2008),-http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/08/04/ 
legacy.  Compared to that same group, Duke’s legacy admits also had lower first year grades.  Id. 
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than non-legacy students in all areas, except perhaps sports.
227
  During its 
investigation of the admissions procedures of Harvard and UCLA, the 
Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights found that, in some 
instances, the legacy preference “was the critical or decisive factor.”
228
  Other 
research showed that highly selective colleges admitted approximately fifteen 
percent of white applicants who failed to meet the minimum standards.
229
 
Carnevale and Rose discovered that when they compared the admissions 
criteria of the top 146 colleges and universities with the academic profiles of 
admitted students,
230
 white students were twice as likely to be admitted, despite 
lacking minimum standards, as compared to black and Hispanic students 
admitted based on race.
231
 
Like legacy admits, development admits
232
 are accepted because they are 
related to rich, influential, or famous people whom the school intends to 
cultivate as major donors.
233
  Some development admits do not necessarily 
have alumni relatives, but the two frequently overlap.
234
  Given their potential 
to lead to significant institutional endowments, development admits enjoy the 
                                                 
 227. MAX H. BAZERMAN & ANN E. TENBRUNSEL, BLIND SPOTS: WHY WE FAIL TO DO 
WHAT’S RIGHT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 42 (2011). 
 228. Peter Schmidt, A History of Legacy Preferences and Privilege, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
FOR THE RICH: LEGACY PREFERENCES IN COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 33, 62 (Richard D. Kahlenberg 
ed., 2010) [hereinafter Schmidt, A History]. 
 229. Peter Schmidt, At the Elite Colleges—Dim White Kids, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 28, 2007, 
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/09/28/at_the_elite_colle
ges___dim_white_kids/?page=full [hereinafter Schmidt, Dim White Kids] (discussing studies by 
“[r]esearchers with access to closely guarded admissions data”). 
 230. The irony of aspiring to achieve a meritocratic system that treats applicants fairly while 
still allowing legacy preferences has not escaped scholars’ attention.  Justice Thomas, for 
example, has criticized legacies for this reason: 
The rallying cry that in the absence of racial discrimination in admissions there would 
be a true meritocracy ignores the fact that the entire process is poisoned by numerous 
exceptions to “merit.”  For example, in the national debate on racial discrimination in 
higher education admissions, much has been made of the fact that elite institutions 
utilize a so-called “legacy” preference to give the children of alumni an advantage in 
admissions.  This, and other, exceptions to a “true” meritocracy give the lie to 
protestations that merit admissions are in fact the order of the day at the Nation’s 
universities. 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 367–68 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 231. Schmidt, Dim White Kids, supra note 229. 
 232. See Golden, Rich Kids, supra note 219 (“The formal practice of giving preference to 
students who parents are wealthy—sometimes called ‘development admits’—has implications for 
the legal challenge to affirmative action . . . .”). 
 233. See Golden, Analytic Survey, supra note 222, at 72 (describing development admits as 
“children of major donors, trustees, politicians, celebrities, and others”). 
 234. Id. 
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same favors as privileged legacy admits: admission despite failing to meet 
academic standards of the school.
235
  For example, Pulitzer Prize-winning 
journalist Daniel Golden reports that Duke University “relaxed [its] standards 
to admit 100 to 125 students annually as a result of family wealth or 
connections, up from about 20 a decade ago.”
236
  Previously, these students 
were tentatively rejected or placed on the wait list.
237
  Harold Wingood, former 
Senior Associate Director of Admissions at Duke, and later Dean of 
Admissions at Clark University, provides an insider’s perspective about 
Duke’s procedures: “We’d take students in some cases with SAT scores 100 
points below the mean, or just outside the top 15% of their class. . . . They 
weren’t slugs, but they weren’t strong enough to get in on their own.”
238
 
Legacy preferences and development admissions act as more than mere 
tiebreakers on an applicant’s chances of acceptance.
239
  Princeton University’s 
Senior Scholar Thomas Espenshade concludes that being a legacy admit is 
equivalent to adding 160 SAT points to a candidate’s score (on the former SAT 
scale of 400-1600).
240
  Similarly, William Bowen and colleagues from the 
Andrew W. Mellon Foundation found that legacy preferences increased a 
candidate’s chances of being admitted to an elite institution by 19.7%.
241
  For 
example, the University of Michigan awards up to twenty discretionary points, 
out of a total 150 point system, to applicants related to donors, legislators, 
faculty, and other notables.
242
 
Aside from the admission preference, legacy applicants enjoy an array of 
other advantages because of their legacy associations.  Some of the extra 
benefits include “well-developed mechanisms for providing the children of 
alumni with coaching and ‘insider’ information to improve their odds of 
                                                 
 235. See Golden, Rich Kids, supra note 219. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id.  One parent of a Duke applicant recognized that her daughter’s academic record did 
not meet Duke’s typical standards: 
She’s bright, she had good grades, but she doesn’t meet the superstar status . . . . Did 
my normal child take the place of somebody who could really make a difference in the 
world?  Sure, yes, to an extent.  But there are so many things you can lose sleep over.  
I’m happy for me and my child. 
Id.  The daughter also acknowledged her acceptance “wasn’t necessarily on [her] own merits.”  
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 239. Golden, Analytic Survey, supra note 222, at 74 (citing BOWEN, KURZWEIL & TOBIN, 
supra note 166); Kahlenberg, 10 Myths, supra note 26. 
 240. Kahlenberg, 10 Myths, supra note 26.  Accord Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 
24, at 56 (finding that, at some elite universities, legacy admits receive a boost of twenty to 160 
SAT points). 
 241. Kahlenberg, 10 Myths, supra note 26. 
 242. Golden, Rich Kids, supra note 219. 
36 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 64:1 
acceptance; formal policies affording a second or even third chance to legacies 
who fail to make the cut; and scholarships and tuition discounts . . . .”
243
  
Brown University, the University of Pennsylvania, and the University of 
Miami have advising programs or admissions counseling for legacy 
applicants.
244
  Some schools, such as the University of Miami, also afford 
legacy applicants interviews unavailable to regular applicants.
245
 
The high admissions rate of legacy preferences and developmental admits 
results from the close communication between a school’s development and 
admissions offices; the admissions office is made aware of any applicant with 
family members who are major donors.
246
  Stanford Admissions Dean Robin 
Mamlet admits, “I will certainly factor in a history of very significant giving to 
Stanford . . . .”
247
  Other admissions deans at selective colleges make similar 
acknowledgements.  For example, Brown University’s Admissions Dean 
Michael Goldberger shares that “having a building named after your family on 
[Brown’s] campus would be a plus factor.”
248
  The University of Miami makes 
clear on its webpage the priority it gives to legacy applications: “As admission 
to UM becomes increasingly more selective, it is important that we pay special 
attention to [the school’s] relationship with alumni and take exceptional care in 
evaluating legacy applications.”
249
 
There is simply no justification for legacy preferences and development 
admits other than to garner donations from alumni or favors from influential 
people.  At one prestigious law school, it was reported that children of 
powerful politicians were specially admitted in exchange for the politicians 
providing jobs for the school’s students.
250
  At that same university, “more 
than 800 undergraduate applicants [within a span of] five years received 
special consideration because they were backed by [the university’s] trustees, 
legislators, and others in powerful posts.”
251
    
                                                 
 243. Schmidt, A History, supra note 228, at 34. 
 244. Golden, Analytic Survey, supra note 222, at 75. 
 245. Id. at 82. 
 246. Golden, Groton Grads, supra note 219. 
 247. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 248. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 249. Legacy Admission, U. MIAMI, http://www6.miami.edu/alumni/umaa/legacy.htm (last 
visited Sept. 27, 2014).  See also Golden, Analytic Survey, supra note 222, at 82. 
 250. See Cohen et al., Clout, supra note 225 (exposing the formalized system of special 
favoritism given to well-connected applicants); Jodi S. Cohen et al., U. of I. Jobs-for-Entry 
Scheme, CHI. TRIB., June 26, 2009, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/chi-ui-trustees-26-
jun26,0,3541380.story [hereinafter Cohen et al., Jobs-for-Entry].  See also Onwuachi-Willig & 
Fricke, supra note 156, at 831–32; Justin Pope, Illinois Scandal Exposes Favoritism in 
Admissions,–USA–TODAY,–(June–4,–2009,–8:43–PM),–http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/ 
education/2009-06-04-illinois-favoritism_N.htm. 
 251. Cohen et al., Jobs-for-Entry, supra note 250. 
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Defenders of legacy preferences and development admissions justify the 
preferences because resulting donations “help[] [schools] provide financial aid 
to students in need.”
252
  Yet the Chronicle of Higher Education found that at 
colleges receiving more than $500 million in endowments, disproportionately 
few low-income students benefit.
253
 
Others might defend legacy preferences and development admits on the 
basis that those admits lead to essential financial support for colleges and 
universities.  For example, “one state university that had eliminated legacy 
preference hurriedly recanted for fear of jeopardizing a multibillion-dollar 
fundraising campaign.”
254
  However, there is no statistically significant 
evidence showing a causal relationship between legacy preferences and 
donations by alumni at the top 100 universities.
255
  Equally significant is that 
the seven institutions that stopped giving legacy preferences during the study 
suffered “no short-term measurable reduction” in donations from alumni as a 
result of ceasing legacy preferences.
256
  The study demonstrates that “[t]he data 
that is currently publicly available refutes the received wisdom that the 
preferences result in increased private giving.”
257
 
Further, those legacy preferences supporters argue there is little difference 
between giving legacy preferences and state institutions setting aside seats for 
in-state students because their parents pay state taxes.
258
  This argument 
ignores the stark statistical data about race.  Setting aside seats for in-state 
students affords any state resident’s child an equal chance at admittance and 
                                                 
 252. Schmidt, Dim White Kids, supra note 229. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Golden, Analytic Survey, supra note 222, at 72. 
 255. See Coffman, O’Neil & Starr, supra note 26, at 101 (studying the relationship between 
legacy admits and donations at the top 100 universities from 1998-2008); Kahlenberg, 10 Myths, 
supra note 26. 
 256. Kahlenberg, 10 Myths, supra note 26 (internal quotation marks omitted).  See also 
Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 24, at 131 (noting “[t]he only school that experienced a 
decrease, Texas A&M, started experiencing a decline years before it announced the end of legacy 
preferences”).  Texas A&M’s drop in donations was similar to that experienced by other top 
Texas universities, which did not alter their legacy preferences during the time of the study.  Id. at 
131–32.  The study concluded that the decline in donations to Texas universities was a result of 
the slow economy.  Id. at 132.  After Texas A&M yielded to pressure to eliminate its legacy 
preference in 2004, donations dropped to $61.9 million from $65.6 million in 2003.  Golden, 
Analytic Survey, supra note 222, at 93.  But in 2005, donations to Texas A&M skyrocketed to $92 
million, then $95.2 million in 2006 and $114 million in 2007.  Id. 
 257. Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 24, at 132. 
 258. See Rebecca R. Ruiz, Debating Legacy Preferences in Admissions, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
15, 2011, 7:49 PM), http://thechoice.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/15/legacy-
admissions/?_php=true&_ 
type=blogs&_r=0 (quoting Debra J. Thomas and Terry L. Shepard, former college administrators, 
each of whom defends legacy admissions). 
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does not perpetuate racial disadvantages.  Moreover, to compare legacy 
preferences to in-state preferences is to ignore the impact of prior 
discriminatory barriers to education for minorities.
259
  Elite schools established 
legacy preferences as a discriminatory response to the admission of the 
“‘wrong’ types of students.”
260
  In the 1920s, an overwhelming number of 
Jewish applicants qualified on the merits for admission into elite schools.
261
  
Consequently, the colleges applied quotas that capped the number of Jewish 
admits, but later sought other ways to limit Jewish enrollment when the quotas 
became controversial.
262
  Legacy preference at schools such as Yale, Harvard, 
and Princeton was one such method.
263
 
Additionally, legacy preferences perpetuate the oppression suffered by 
minorities.  That minorities may now be admitted to top colleges does not 
account for the generations that could not enter segregated colleges and 
universities.  In fact, “‘no selective college or university was making 
determined efforts to seek out and admit substantial numbers of African 
Americans’ before 1960.”
264
  In Mississippi, for example, “[i]t was not until 
1962 that the first black student, James Meredith, was admitted to a white 
public college in [the state], and then only under the court order and with the 
protection of federal troops.”
265
  Until 1969, the University of Texas Law 
                                                 
 259. See Onwuachi-Willig & Fricke, supra note 156, at 831 (discussing the discriminatory 
effect of legacy preferences). 
 260. Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 24, at 56. 
 261. See Schmidt, A History, supra note 228, at 39 (discussing the rise of Jewish enrollment 
at Harvard and Yale); Shadowen, Tulante & Alpern, supra note 24, at 56 (tracing the origin of 
legacy preferences to anti-Semitism); Kahlenberg, 10 Myths, supra note 26 (suggesting “legacies 
originated following World War I as a reaction to an influx of immigrant students, particularly 
Jews, into America’s selective colleges”).  The increase in Jewish immigrants led to a 
corresponding rise in Jewish applicants at elite schools: 
The first German Jews who came were easily absorbed into the social patter; but at the 
turn of the century the bright Russian and Polish Jewish lads from the Boston public 
schools began to arrive.  There were enough of them in 1906 to form the Menorah 
Society, and in another fifteen years Harvard had her “Jewish problem.” 
SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THREE CENTURIES OF HARVARD: 1636-1936 417 (1946). 
 262. See Schmidt, A History, supra note 228, at 40–41; Kahlenberg, 10 Myths, supra note 26. 
 263. Schmidt, A History, supra note 228, at 42. 
 264. Beatrice L. Bridglall, A Misguided Debate About Affirmative Action?, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 
15, 22 (2006) (citing BOWEN & BOK, supra note 171, at 74–78; ELIZABETH A. DUFFY & IDANA 
GOLDBERG, CRAFTING A CLASS: COLLEGE ADMISSIONS & FINANCIAL AID, 1955-1994 138–39 
(1998)). 
 265. Gil Kujovich, Desegregation in Higher Education: The Limits of a Judicial Remedy, 44 
BUFF. L. REV. 1, 4 (1996).  “[I]n 1965, of the one percent of law students who were African-
American, more than one-third were in all-black law schools . . . .”  Marcia G. Synnott, The 
Evolving Diversity Rationale in University Admissions: From Regents v. Bakke to the University 
of Michigan Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 463, 491 (2005). 
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School offered scholarships exclusively to whites.
266
  The University of 
Houston did not graduate its “first black law student until 1970 and fewer than 
one dozen Mexican Americans graduated before 1972.”
267
  Notably, at 
selective law schools, the number of black students admitted was dismal: 
[I]n the early 1960s at schools like Boalt Hall, Michigan, and . . . 
[UCLA], the “inexorable zero” routinely characterized African 
American enrollment patterns.  In the fall of 1965, Boalt, Michigan, 
New York University . . . , and UCLA had a combined total of four 
African Americans out of 4843 students, which, shockingly, is one 
fewer than the University of Mississippi . . . , where the law school 
begrudgingly enrolled five [b]lacks in 1965 to avoid jeopardizing a 
substantial grant from the Ford Foundation.  Similarly, between 1948 
and 1968, the University of Texas enrolled a total of 8018 [w]hite 
first-year law students and only 37 African Americans.  Between 
1956 and 1967, there were between zero and two African American 
enrollments at [the University of Texas Law School] annually.
268
 
The exclusivity of white institutions of higher learning
269
 resulted in 
generations of white alumni who could pass on the benefit of their admission 
to their progeny.
270
 
On the other hand, some may support legacy preferences because they 
consider the preference a way to benefit minorities.  During oral arguments in 
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and Immigrant 
Rights and Fight for Equality By Any Means Necessary,
271
 Justice Sotomayor 
                                                 
 266. HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 14. 
 267. Michael A. Olivas, Governing Badly: Theory and Practice of Bad Ideas in College 
Decision Making, 87 IND. L.J. 951, 958 (2012) [hereinafter Olivas, Governing Badly]. 
 268. William C. Kidder, The Struggle for Access from Sweatt to Grutter: A History of African 
American, Latino, and American Indian Law School Admissions, 1950-2000, 19 HARV. 
BLACKLETTER L.J. 1, 9–10 (2003) (citations omitted). 
 269. State senator Rodney Ellis previously noted that “[r]ace was used in Texas over a long 
period of time to keep people of color, especially African-Americans, out of the higher education 
system . . . .”  John Brittain & Eric L. Bloom, Admitting the Truth: The Effect of Affirmative 
Action, Legacy Preferences, and the Meritocratic Ideal on Students of Color in College 
Admissions, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE RICH: LEGACY PREFERENCES IN COLLEGE 
ADMISSIONS 123, 140 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 270. Boyce F. Martin, Jr. & Donya Khalili, Privilege Paving the Way for Privilege: How 
Judges Will Confront the Legal Ramifications of Legacy Admission to Public and Private 
Universities, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE RICH: LEGACY PREFERENCES IN COLLEGE 
ADMISSIONS 199, 200 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2010).  See also Olivas, Governing Badly, 
supra note 267, at 958 (“Children of early 1970s UTLS [University of Texas Law School] 
minority graduates, if born while their parents attended law school, would now be eligible for the 
alumni preference, but they would be in competition with the thousands of white applicants who 
could and would also invoke the privilege.”). 
 271. 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). 
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expressed concerns that if colleges or universities eliminated these preferences, 
minorities would suffer: “It’s always wonderful for minorities that they finally 
get in, they finally have children and now you’re going to do away for that 
preference for them.  It seems that the game posts keeps changing every few 
years for minorities.”
272
 
To the contrary, minorities are disproportionately harmed by legacy 
preferences.
273
  Underrepresented minorities comprise 6.7% of legacy 
applicants compared to 12.5% of total applicants to elite universities.
274
  At 
Texas A&M, for example, the university enrolled 321 white legacy admits in 
2002, compared with three black and twenty-five Hispanic legacy admits.
275
  
At the University of Virginia, the population of legacy admits accepted during 
early admission was 91% white, 1.6% black, and .05% Hispanic.
276
  In the 
2000-01 academic year, Princeton accepted ten Hispanic and four African 
American legacy admits out of a total 567 legacy applicants.
277
  If one were to 
“[j]uxtapose the numbers of white alumni parents whose children apply to 
college with those few minorities who are in a position to pass it on, . . . [the 
data would suggest that] such admissions will never improve to the point 
where alumni privilege produces points for a substantial number of minority 
students.”
278
  While some may doubt whether eliminating legacy preferences at 
elite schools makes a meaningful difference in obtaining greater class 
equality,
279
 given the statistics, eliminating legacy preferences will make a 
difference in obtaining racial diversity. 
                                                 
 272. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5–6, Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 
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Although the practice of legacy preferences and development admits itself 
might not be subject to the demands of strict scrutiny,
280
 schools that desire to 
use race-based admissions are subject to strict scrutiny and should not be 
permitted to give these types of preferences.  Because Fisher mandates that 
schools demonstrate that race-neutral alternatives are not workable before they 
rely on racial admissions criteria,
281
 schools must show they have done all they 
can to increase diversity without using race.  Such a process should include the 
schools’ discontinuation of policies such as legacy preferences and 
development admits that predominately benefit whites,
282
 which decrease a 
school’s diversity.
283
 
Although eliminating legacy preferences may not achieve an equivalent 
level of diversity as race-based programs,
284
 “a large legacy population on 
campus limits racial and economic diversity.”
285
  Therefore, a school should 
not prevail on using race-based admissions when it has declined to take 
measures that reduce racial disparity, such as eliminating legacy and 
development admits.
286
  As Justice Clarence Thomas stated, “Were this court 
to have the courage to forbid the use of racial discrimination in admissions, 
                                                 
 280. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 368 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
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 284. Researchers Thomas J. Espenshade and Chang Y. Chung concluded that 
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legacy preferences . . . might quickly become less popular . . . .”
287
  Perhaps the 
courage to refrain from giving preferences to legacies and development admits 
must begin at the institution.
288
 
D.  Other University-Based Programs: Recruitment, Retention, and Financial 
Aid 
Schools use recruiting, retention, and financial aid programs in conjunction 
with their admissions programs to enroll and retain racially diverse students.
289
  
Researchers conclude “the success of percent plans in broadening educational 
opportunity beyond high school requires strong outreach efforts to encourage 
rank-eligible students to apply for admission.”
290
  For example, the University 
of Texas, with the aid of the private sector, made considerable efforts to recruit 
potential minority applicants and benefitted from privately funded minority 
scholarships.
291
  It also funded public scholarships through the Longhorn 
Opportunity Scholarship and the Century Scholars Program for students who 
graduate within the top ten percent of their class from high schools that are 
traditionally underrepresented at universities and colleges.
292
  The University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill enables economically disadvantaged students 
to attend college debt-free by working ten to twelve hours a week in a federal 
work-study program.
293
  Other universities aggressively recruit from high 
schools with high minority population by informing students about higher 
education opportunities, the application process, and the admission process.
294
 
The Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence supports the requirement that 
universities implement recruitment, retention, and financial aid programs that 
would enhance their diversity before relying on racial classifications.
295
  The 
Court has insisted on consideration of race-neutral alternatives, even those 
outside the challenged program’s parameters, to comply with strict scrutiny.  In 
                                                 
 287. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 368 n.10 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 288. See Golden, Analytic Survey, supra note 222, at 72 (noting that, in undertaking post-
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at 19. 
 294. HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at 52–55. 
 295. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 789 
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Croson, the Court summarized a broad array of race-neutral alternatives and 
noted the city should have contemplated that 
[s]implification of bidding procedures, relaxation of bonding 
requirements, and training and financial aid for disadvantaged 
entrepreneurs of all races would open the public contracting market 
to all those who have suffered the effects of past societal 
discrimination or neglect.  Many of the formal barriers to new 
entrants may be the product of bureaucratic inertia more than actual 
necessity, and may have a disproportionate effect on the 
opportunities open to new minority firms.  Their elimination or 
modification would have little detrimental effect on the city’s 
interests and would serve to increase the opportunities available to 
minority business without classifying individuals on the basis of 
race.
296
 
Although Croson involved remedial discrimination as a basis for the city’s 
program, its lessons are equally applicable to affirmative action programs 
premised on diversity.  The Court’s identification of financial aid as a race-
neutral alternative in Croson demonstrates that it is not unrealistic to expect 
institutions of higher learning to assist students in funding their education in 
order to increase the institutions’ diversity.  Similarly, the expectation that 
training can ameliorate low diversity levels is easily transferable to universities 
and colleges.  In order to maintain its diversity, a university can provide 
mentoring and academic assistance programs to retain its minority students and 
facilitate their matriculation.  Also, schools must address the “formal barriers 
to new entrants”
297
 by recruiting from underperforming high schools and 
training students who attend those schools about the college application 
process.  Therefore, like Croson, universities have at their disposal race-neutral 
programs that target financing, training, and recruitment to increase diversity.  
A university’s failure to consider these options should render its racial program 
invalid for failing the narrow tailoring requirement. 
E.  The Pipeline: Community Outreach 
Although colleges and universities are not required to “exhaust[] . . . every 
conceivable race-neutral alternative,”
298
 approaches that focus on increasing 
the pipeline of applicants prepared for higher education contribute to diversity 
at colleges and universities.  Institutions of higher learning recognize that 
relying on university-based programs to recruit from minority schools and 
                                                 
 296. Croson, 488 U.S. at 509–10. 
 297. Id. at 510. 
 298. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013) (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 343 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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providing adequate financial assistance is not enough to retain diversity.
299
  
Some higher education institutions seek to increase diversity by improving the 
structural underpinnings of education.
300
  The U.S. Department of Education 
has recognized colleges’ and universities’ success in designing race-neutral 
programs: 
Many colleges and universities around the country are partnering 
with elementary and secondary schools, recognizing that these 
partnerships expand their educational mission by giving them an 
opportunity to put into practice education theory.  Moreover, 
institutions recognize that helping to better educate young people 
who attend traditionally low-performing schools will broaden the 
pool of students who can qualify for admission to college.
301
 
Models of these successful outreach programs can be found across the 
nation. The University of Houston, for example, supports a K-12 technology 
charter school on its campus, and thereby provides 200 students exposure to 
“scientific methodology, technological literacy, leadership, and other skills.”
302
  
Texas Tech University reaches out to twenty-six elementary schools by 
inviting disadvantaged and minority students to participate in the Future 
Scholars program, which pairs students with professors who emphasize college 
readiness.
303
  Baylor University hosts several programs to improve the 
education of minority children, such as Science Discovery Week, a summer 
camp where students live on campus to take part in science and engineering 
activities, and the Center for Learning Abilities and Talent Development, 
which provides events such as the February Interdisciplinary Creative Problem 
Solving Conference throughout the year.
304
  Florida offers the College Reach 
Out Program for low-income, underperforming students in grades six to 
twelve; seventy-two percent of the students served are African American and 
ten percent are Hispanic.
305
 
Graduate schools also reach out to the community to improve racial diversity 
at their schools.  The University of Texas at El Paso Law School founded the 
                                                 
 299. See, e.g., McMahan & Willett, supra note 180, at 171 (noting that “many universities 
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Law School Preparation Institute to help students, especially minorities, 
prepare for the law school application process and legal studies.
306
  The 
success of the Law School Preparation Institute is demonstrated by student-
participants’ acceptance at top schools: seventy-three percent attend top 100 
law schools, fifty-eight percent attend top fifty law schools, and thirty-three 
percent attend top fifteen law schools.
307
  Additionally, the King Hall Outreach 
Program at UC Davis provides participants with classes in writing, logic, and 
LSAT preparation.
308
  Students also have the opportunity to participate in 
Moot Court and Mock Trial and meet with tutors and admission personnel.
309
  
The UC Davis School of Law provides another approach by offering a Pre-
Law Boot Camp “designed to assist high potential undergraduate students from 
underrepresented communities with their undergraduate performance and 
preparation for admission to law school.”
310
  Harvard Law School has 
partnered with New York University Law School and the Advantage Testing 
Foundation to support their TRIALS program, a residential scholarship 
program that helps minority and economically disadvantaged students gain 
admission to the nation’s leading law schools.
311
 
At the University of Texas, combining outreach programs with race-neutral 
admissions programs is effective at achieving diversity.  Responding to 
Hopwood’s prohibition against consideration of race, UT Austin expanded its 
outreach programs to increase minority enrollment while it implemented the 
Top Ten Percent plan.
312
  The school achieved a more diverse entering class 
under the post-Hopwood system (that did not explicitly consider race), 
compared to when the school implemented a plan that accounted for race.
313
  
Although there has been no study on how much of the school’s increased 
diversity can be attributed to community outreach, the University’s record 
makes it difficult to ignore that outreach programs are a race-neutral alternative 
that can supplement other race-neutral admissions programs. 
The importance of outreach programs is widely supported: “[O]utreach and 
aid programs that target minority communities and, as a result, double or triple 
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applications from minority students can contribute strongly to gains.”
314
  
However, the problem with promoting outreach programs is convincing 
colleges and universities that costs and administrative burdens are justified.
315
  
Higher education institutions should be obligated to consider outreach 
programs as a supplement to other race-neutral programs because, as 
previously discussed, the Supreme Court has mandated that race-based 
programs be a last resort.
316
  Further, those race-neutral alternatives should 
target increasing opportunities to reach a diverse population of students who 
are prepared for higher education.  It is widely understood that one underlying 
problem with attaining racial diversity in higher education is the dearth of an 
applicant pool.
317
  As the United States Department of Education has 
advocated, “developmental approaches . . . demonstrate the wide range of 
                                                 
 314. HORN & FLORES, supra note 72, at viii–ix.  See also Nelson, supra note 119, at 26–28 
(advocating for higher education schools to include programs that increase access to educational 
opportunities for disadvantaged students before they apply); Torres, supra note 128, at 1599 
(“Activities like outreach, recruitment, and financial aid are critical to a university in making a 
diverse student body possible.”). 
 315. See Malamud, Class Privilege, supra note 172, at 741 (expressing doubt that “elite-
school admissions offices would find more outreach to be cost justified, given its likely returns”). 
 316. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 790 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“[I]ndividual racial classifications . 
. . may be considered legitimate only if they are a last resort to achieving a compelling interest.”).  
In Croson, Justice O’Connor articulated an expectation that race-neutral alternatives be 
considered: 
As noted by the court below, it is almost impossible to assess whether the Richmond 
Plan is narrowly tailored to remedy prior discrimination since it is not linked to 
identified discrimination in any way.  We limit ourselves to two observations . . . .  
First, there does not appear to have been any consideration of the use of race-neutral 
means to increase minority business participation in city contracting. . . .  Many of the 
barriers to minority participation in the construction industry relied upon by the city to 
justify a racial classification appear to be race-neutral.  If [minority-owned businesses] 
disproportionately lack capital or cannot meet bonding requirements, a race-neutral 
program of city financing for small firms would, a fortiori, lead to greater minority 
participation. 
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 507 (1989).  The Court’s recommendation that the 
city could finance small firms recognizes that race-neutral alternatives should go beyond the 
eligibility criteria and remedy the root of the problems that have traditionally kept minority-
owned businesses from competing in construction subcontracts.  In Parents Involved, Justice 
Kennedy pointed out the available race-neutral alternatives to diversify K-12 schools: “strategic 
site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the 
demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students 
and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by 
race.”  551 U.S. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).  The 
alternatives Justice Kennedy suggested highlight that schools should be open-minded to solutions 
that exist beyond their walls. 
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efforts that can be undertaken to enrich the pipeline of applicants prepared to 
succeed in any academic setting . . . .”
318
 
III.  TRANSPARENCY 
To evaluate whether an alternative works “about as well” as a raced-based 
program, one needs to clearly understand the race-based program.  
Unfortunately, higher education institutions have not made the details of their 
programs transparent.
319
  Justice Ginsburg warned that precluding schools 
from explicitly using race as a factor might cause them to “‘resort to 
camouflage’ to ‘maintain their minority enrollment.’”
320
  Similarly, Justice 
Kennedy feared that “[i]f universities are given the latitude to administer 
programs that are tantamount to quotas, they will have few incentives to make 
the existing minority admissions schemes transparent and protective of 
individual review.”
321
  By outlawing the use of race as a sole or predominate 
factor in school admission programs, the Court has traded in transparency for a 
holistic review.
322
  As Justice Ginsburg observed, “the vaunted alternatives 
suffer from ‘the disadvantage of deliberate obfuscation.’”
323
    
Fisher may, in fact, remedy the schools’ temptation to obfuscate their 
admissions process.  In Fisher, the Court reiterated that “[s]trict scrutiny does 
not permit a court to accept a school’s assertion that its admissions process 
uses race in a permissible way without a court giving close analysis to the 
evidence of how the process works in practice.”
324
  Compliance with strict 
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scrutiny’s necessity requirement would likely lead schools to be more 
transparent about their programs because they would need to articulate their 
objective and the measures of success for their program.  In order to avoid 
being found “feeble in fact,”
325
 a school must make sufficient disclosure of its 
program to satisfy the demanding requirements of narrow tailoring and 
necessity.
326
  According to one commentator, “[a]s both logic and experience 
have shown, Grutter’s narrow-tailoring requirements are largely meaningless 
without full disclosure of the operation and effects of preferences.  Secret 
admissions can’t possibly be narrow tailoring.”
327
 
IV.  ACADEMIC FREEDOM 
The Court has “long recognized that, given the important purpose of public 
education and the expansive freedoms of speech and thought associated with 
the university environment, universities occupy a special niche in our 
constitutional tradition.”
328
  The Court’s recognition of academic freedom has 
extended to a number of cases.  Beginning with Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
329
 
Justice Frankfurter highlighted “four essential freedoms” of the university: “to 
determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, 
how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.”
330
 
The Court emphasized the commitment to protecting academic freedom in 
Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
331
 acknowledging that doing so has 
                                                 
 325. Id. 
 326. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 784 (2007) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (stating that “[a]s part of [the 
government’s] burden it must establish, in detail, how decisions based on an individual student’s 
race are made in a challenged program”). 
 327. See Richard Sander, Online Fisher Symposium: A Path to Radical Reform of Racial 
Preferences Without Banning Them, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 4, 2012, 5:45 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/online-fisher-symposium-a-path-to-radical-reform-of-racial-
preferences-without-banning-them/.  See also Borkoski, supra note 177 (explaining Sander’s and 
Taylor’s argument that “[t]ransparency would also help preferred-minority students make more 
informed choices in choosing colleges and would help inform researchers, voters, and 
policymakers”). 
 328. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329 (2003).  A number of scholars have explored the 
implications of affirmative action on academic freedom.  See, e.g., Steve Sanders, Legal 
Scholarship Highlight: Affirmative Action and Academic Freedom, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 14, 
2012, 10:06 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/legal-scholarship-highlight-affirmative-
action-and-academic-freedom/. 
 329. 354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
 330. Id. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result) (quoting senior scholars and Chancellors 
from the University of Cape Town and the University of the Witwatersrand) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 331. 385 U.S. 589 (1967). 
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“transcendent value to all of us and not merely to teachers concerned.”
332
  In 
Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing,
333
 the Court acknowledged 
that “[w]hen judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic 
decision[,] . . . they should show great respect for the faculty’s professional 
judgment.”
334
  Judges “may not override it unless it is such a substantial 
departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or 
committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment.”
335
  
Further, in its Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz
336
 decision, 
the Court observed that “[c]ourts are particularly ill-equipped to evaluate 
academic performance.”
337
  Thus, the Court has embraced the idea that the 
“educational autonomy” of schools has “a constitutional dimension, grounded 
in the First Amendment . . . .”
338
 
However, the landscape of academic freedom has changed over the course 
of the Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence.  Academic freedom still 
permits schools to choose their educational mission, but does not grant schools 
blind faith to conduct their own admissions procedures.  Fisher makes clear 
that the methods a school chooses to attain the educational benefits of diversity 
are not immunized from rigorous judicial review if those means are not 
narrowly tailored to the school’s objective. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Article is not to advocate one program over another.  
Critics can find flaws in each program, but finding a workable race-neutral 
alternative does not depend on designing a flawless program.  This Article 
raises the issue that if a school achieves racial diversity using race-neutral 
means, other institutions will have the burden of showing why a similar 
program would be unworkable before they can implement race-based 
admissions programs.  While one race-neutral program may not achieve as 
much racial diversity as a race-based program, a combination of race-neutral 
programs may nevertheless achieve the desired level of diversity.  To follow 
Fisher, narrow tailoring requires, at a minimum, that institutions consult 
available resources
339
 and published studies.  Before a school implements a 
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race-based admissions policy, it must articulate to the court why any 
combination of these race-neutral programs is unworkable. 
In light of the evidence that race-neutral programs have succeeded in 
attaining diversity without compromising academic performance, institutions 
of higher education will be hard pressed to justify using racial admissions.  
Ultimately, they may not be able to avoid the inevitable conclusion that 
although diversity is important,
340
 race-based affirmative action in admissions 
is unnecessary, at least in terms of how the Court’s strict scrutiny jurisprudence 
has construed “necessary.” 
Fisher’s demanding narrow tailoring analysis mandates that more schools 
strive to develop innovative programs that enhance student diversity without 
depending upon racial considerations.  As one school has realized, “it takes 
creativity, a lot of hard work, and a lot of money before an institution can hope 
to achieve diversity without using affirmative action.”
341
  But, “it [is] worth the 
cost.”
342
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